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ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION
Serife Genc, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2012
This dissertation analyzes di¤erent dimensions of the impacts of immigration from a host
country perspective. The focus of the rst chapter is on the link between wage premium
paid to college education and immigration in Canada. College education premium remained
stagnant between 1981 and 2008 in the country. Meanwhile the proportion of hours worked
by college graduates among immigrants increased signicantly. I use a partial equilibrium
model to explore the impact of increasing share of college-graduate immigrants on the slug-
gish movement of skill premium. I run two counterfactual experiments to achieve this ob-
jective. The results from both experiments shows that the increase in the share of skilled
immigrants had a negative impact on the college premium in Canada. The second chapter
is a joint study with David Brown, Julie Hotchkiss, Myriam Quispe-Agnoli. In this chapter
we investigate how the employment of undocumented workers varies along the U.S. busi-
ness cycles in comparison to the employment of documented workers. We illustrate that
undocumented employment is signicantly more volatile than the documented employment.
The explanation we propose for this evidence is the higher elasticity of substitution between
undocumented labor and capital compared to documented labor. Using a partial equilib-
rium model we can explain 80% of the volatility of the cyclical component of undocumented
employment during the 2000s. The last chapter analyzes the impacts of immigration on the
earning, welfare, and college attainment of native Canadians. It is an extension of the partial
equilibrium model in chapter 1 to a general equilibrium setting. The ndings in this paper
suggest that the shift in the composition of immigrants towards college graduates discour-
ages some natives from college education. The welfare impacts of immigration on natives
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are also analyzed. An interesting result in this analysis is that the shift in the composition
of immigrants towards college graduates increases the welfare of college-graduate natives as
well as the ones with less than college education. The reasons for this surplus accruing to
natives are an increase in the wage earnings of both education groups as well as the decrease
in the tax rates on labor income.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes di¤erent dimensions of the impacts of immigration from the host
country perspective. In the rst chapter I study Canada, which is a country with a distinct
immigration policy. Canada started implementing a selective immigration policy targeting
individuals with skills such as education, language, etc. A natural outcome of this policy is
a change in the education prole of immigrants to include more college-educated individuals.
I document that the wage premium paid to college education has remained stagnant between
1981 and 2008 in the country. Using a partial equilibrium model I explore how the increasing
portion of college graduates among the immigrant labor force a¤ected the sluggish movement
of skill premium. I run two counterfactual experiments to achieve this objective. The results
of the rst counterfactual experiment suggest that when there is no change in the share
of hours worked by college graduates among immigrants, the college education premium
increases by 9.7% between 1981 and 2008. In the second counterfactual scenario I simulate
an economy in which the foreign born skilled hours grows at the same rate as in the U.S. The
results from this counterfactual scenario show that the faster growth rate in college graduate
employment accounts for 25% of the di¤erence in the growth rates of skill premium between
the two countries.
The second chapter is a joint study with David Brown, Julie Hotchkiss, Myriam Quispe-
Agnoli. The focus of this chapter is on the business cycle properties of undocumented
workers employment. We use quarterly data between 1990 and 2008 from the state of
Georgia and investigate the adjustment in the employment of undocumented workers along
the business cycles. In comparison to documented workers, we nd the cyclical component
of undocumented employment to be signicantly more volatile. We propose the higher
elasticity of substitutability between these workers and physical capital compared to the
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documented labor in production as an explanation of this evidence. Using a partial equilib-
rium model where rms produce output with documented and undocumented labor as well
as capital we can explain 80% of the volatility of the cyclical component of undocumented
employment observed between 2000 and 2008.
In the last chapter I analyze the impacts of immigration on the earning, welfare, and
college attainment of native Canadians. This chapter is an extension of the rst chapter
to a general equilibrium setting. To evaluate Canadas unique immigration policy, which
explicitly targets highly educated individuals, rst I calibrate my model to 1981 data. Then
I simulate the 2008 Canadian economy in which the relative size of the immigrant labor force
is larger and the proportion of college graduates among immigrants is higher. Following this,
I run counterfactual experiments to analyze the increase in the relative share of immigrants
and the shift in their composition. My ndings suggest that the shift in the composition
of immigrants towards college graduates results in a 7% point lower college attainment rate
among natives. The impact of the increase in the proportion of college-graduate immigrants
on the college premium among natives amounts to a slight increase. This result is an
outcome of higher ability natives being selected into college education in response to having
more college-graduate immigrants in the country. The welfare impacts of immigration are
analyzed for the highest, lowest, and median ability natives. An interesting result in this
analysis is that the shift in the composition of immigrants towards college graduates benets
all three types, including the highest ability individual who is a college graduate. The
reasons for this surplus accruing to natives are an increase in the wage earnings of both
college graduates and those with less than college education as well as the decrease in the
tax rates on labor income.
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2.0 SKILL PREMIUM AND IMMIGRATION IN CANADA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Wage inequality between college graduates and less than college-educated individuals re-
mained stagnant between 1981 and 2008 in Canada. On the other hand a similar country,
U.S. has been a place where college educated enjoyed increasing benets during the same
period. The sluggish movement of the college education premium in Canada was accom-
panied by an increasing share of hours worked by college graduates. The rise in the ratio
of college graduate hours to those with below college education among immigrants was an
important factor contributing to the growth in the share of hours worked by skilled workers
in the country.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the shift in the composition
of immigrant hours towards college graduates on the slow increase of skill premium in the
country. To achieve this objective I use a partial equilibrium model where the output
is produced using skilled and unskilled labor together with two types capital. Another
important feature of the production technology is that capital is complementary to skilled
labor. A production function with these features was rst used by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-
Rull and Violante (2000) (hereafter KORV (2000))[50] to analyze the skill premium dynamics
in the U.S. I follow their methodology with a particular emphasis on the changes observed
in the education composition of immigrant labor force in Canada.
Studying how much international immigration accounts for the evolution of the educa-
tion premium is important because it has signicant policy implications for the country.
Canadian immigration policy until the early 1960s was based on a national-origin preference
system. This system limited the entry of some national origin groups and facilitated the
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entry of others. In 1967, Canada introduced a points system which selected immigrants
with desirable skills.1 This change in the immigration policy of Canada, enhanced the inow
of skilled immigrants to the country. In addition a similar candidate immigration policy is
being considered in other developed countries. The most recent example of such countries is
France. In 2007, a new immigration law which gives the government new powers to encour-
age high skilled immigration took e¤ect in the country. Among the main objectives of the
new policy are recruiting skilled workers, facilitating foreign studentsstay and tightening
the rules on family reunication.2 Therefore a quantitative analysis of an increasing share of
skilled immigrants on the relative return to education in labor markets is important to shed
light on the possible impacts of a selective immigration policy for other developed countries
as well.
The paper is related to two strands of the literature. The rst one covers the studies
which are concerned with the impact of immigrants on the wage earnings of natives. A brief
look at this literature shows that there is conicting evidence. The spatial approach makes
use of the variation in the immigrant inows in local labor markets to estimate the impacts
of immigration. Altonji and Card (1991)[2] treat immigrants and natives as two factors of
production, whereas Card (1990, 2001)([21],[22]) assume that immigrants and natives of the
same skill group are perfect substitutes. These studies nd a small impact of immigrants
on the wages of natives. On the other hand, research that use a nation-wide approach nd
signicant and negative impacts of immigration on native earnings. For instance, Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1997)[14] and Borjas (2003)[13] estimate the impact of immigration on
natives of di¤erent education and experience groups. These studies nd a larger and negative
impact of immigration on the wage earnings of the natives. Similarly, Aydemir and Borjas
(2007)[5] compare the impact of immigration induced labor supply shocks on the relative
earnings of natives in di¤erent education groups in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Their
results suggest that the immigration experience of Canada narrowed the wage inequality
due to the high proportion of skilled immigrants. For the U.S. they conclude that the wage
inequality increased as a result of immigration since the immigrant population consists more
1Source: Kelley, N. and Trebilcock, M. (2010) "The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian
Immigration Policy"
2Source: Murphy, K.(2006) "Frances New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled"
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of low-skilled individuals.
The second closely related literature looks at the college education premium in Canada.
Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998)[61] estimate the impact of the relative supply of skilled
workers on the skill premium in Canada and the U.S. They use the Katz and Murphy
(1992)[51] model to explain why skill premium moved di¤erently in two countries. Their
results suggest that changes in supply appear to be the most important factor causing decade
to decade and country to country variation in trends in relative wages of college educated
labor.
Kryvtsov and Ueberfeldt (2009)[52] is a more recent work which compares the premium
paid to higher education in the U.S. and Canadian labor markets for the 1980-2000 period.
They use a partial equilibrium model with a production technology a la KORV (2000)[50].
They nd the di¤erence in the fraction of university graduates in the working age population
in 1980 and the growth rate of this fraction to account for two thirds of the education
premium di¤erence between the U.S. and Canada.
This paper is closely related to Aydemir and Borjas (2007)[5] and Kryvtsov and Ueber-
feldt (2009)[52]. Di¤erent from Aydemir and Borjas (2007)[5], I use a production technology
which has the feature of complementarity between capital and skilled labor. Kryvtsov and
Ueberfeldt (2009)[52] use the same production technology however they do not consider the
impact of the changes in the relative skilled hours among immigrants. The special empha-
sis of this paper on immigrants and the impact of the shift in their composition on college
education premium is a key element distinguishing this paper from Kryvtsov and Ueberfeldt
(2009)[52].
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2.2, I discuss some Canadian data
facts. The subsequent section is the quantitative analysis part where I explain the model,
its parameters and their specication. This section also includes an assessment of the model
in matching the behavior of skill premium in the country for the 1981-2008 period as well as
the results of the counterfactual experiments. The last section summarizes the results and
concludes.
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2.2 DATA
In this section I present some stylized facts about the relative wages and the total hours
worked by college-educated and non-college workers in Canada for the 1981 and 2008 pe-
riod.3
Table 1 presents data on the shares of total hours worked by four education groups in
Canada. To put things into perspective, I report the same shares for the U.S. as well.4
In 1981, the share of college graduate hours was 20% in the country. This share doubled
between 1981 and 2008, reaching 38.8% at the end of the period. Meanwhile in the U.S.
hours worked by college-educated increased its share from 30% to 47% , which is a slower
increase compared to Canada.
Less than High School Some College+
Canada High School Graduates College Graduates
1981 32.5% 23.6% 23.9% 19.9%
1991 19.9% 21.2% 33.4% 25.3%
2001 8.4% 14.2% 48.2% 29.2%
2008 6.5% 11.5% 43.2% 38.8%
U.S.
1980 15.4% 34.2% 19.3% 31.1%
1990 7.3% 26.8% 28.7% 37.3%
2000 6.3% 24.6% 26.4% 42.7%
2008 5.1% 22.2% 25.7% 47.0%
Table 1: Employment shares by education level in % units. Employment is measured as
total hours worked by each education group
3Details about sample selection and the construction of skilled and unskilled categories are available in
the appendix.
4Hereafter skilled and college-educated are used interchangeably.
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In table 2, I report the change in hourly wages and hours worked by college-educated
individuals relative to non-college. As pointed out in table 1 results, the ratio of skilled
to unskilled hours almost doubled during 1981-2008 period. During the 1980s there was a
30% rise in this ratio. The increase in the skilled hours relative to unskilled slowed down to
19.4% in 1990s. The most remarkable increase was recorded between 2001 and 2008 where
the relative share of college graduate hours increased by 43%. On the other hand there was
a 17% increase in the hours worked by college graduates relative to those with no college
education in the 2000s in the U.S. labor markets. The change in the ratio of hours by college
graduates to non-college was 67% in the U.S. between 1981 and 2008 which is smaller than
the one recorded for Canada.
College graduates change relative change relative
Canada employment share wage
1981-1991 31.2% -1.0%
1991-2001 19.4% 1.7%
2001-2008 43.0% 0.7%
1981-2008 93.5% 1.5%
U.S.
1980-1990 27.4% 9.8%
1990-2000 22.9% 5.5%
2000-2008 17.4% 3.8%
1980-2008 67.7% 18.9%
Table 2: % change in hours worked and the hourly wages of college graduates relative to
non-college
The fast increase in the relative share of hours worked by college graduates was accom-
panied by a sluggish growth in their relative wages between 1981 and 2008. The college
education premium displayed 1.5% increase throughout the whole period. During the 1980s,
college graduates experienced a slight decline in their hourly wages relative to less than college
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educated ones. 1990 to 2008 was a period of slight increase in college education premium in
Canada. The U.S. exhibits a di¤erent example in terms of the dynamics of skill premium.
The college-educated enjoyed a 19% increase in their relative earnings between 1980 and
2008.
Table 3 reports the skilled hours relative to unskilled for natives and immigrants. The
hours worked by native college graduates relative to less than college educated increased
from 19% to 42% in Canada. The college-graduate immigrantsrelative hours rose faster
displaying a four-fold increase from 5% to 21%. A similar pattern is observed in the U.S.
as well.
Native college/ Immigrant college/
non-college non-college
1981 19.5% 5.4%
1991 27.3% 6.7%
2001 31.4% 9.8%
2008 42.1% 21.3%
U.S.
1980 41.5% 3.5%
1990 53.6% 5.8%
2000 64.8% 9.7%
2008 74.5% 14.3%
Table 3: Hours worked by immigrant and native college graduates relative to total non-college
Decomposing the college-graduate immigrantsrelative hours, I get two shares. The rst
one is the ratio of immigrant college to immigrant non-college hours, and the second one is
the ratio of immigrant non-college to total non-college hours. In table 4, I present these
two ratios. The behavior of the rst ratio is of more interest since it shows the change in
the skill composition among hours worked by immigrants. This ratio increased from 28%
to 78% from the beginning of the 1980s until the end of the 2000s.
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Immigrant college/ Immigrant non-college/
Canada immigrant non-college total non-college
1981 28.5% 18.9%
1991 41.5% 16.2%
2001 39.0% 25.2%
2008 78.5% 27.1%
Table 4: Decomposition of hours worked by immigrant college graduates relative total non-
college
An overall analysis of the three decades shows that in Canada premium paid to college
education has either declined slightly or increased very sluggishly between 1981 and 2008.
The fast growth in the hours worked by college graduates relative to non-college individuals
provides evidence for the possible impact of the supply side of the labor market on the
stagnant behavior of skill premium in the country. In addition the remarkable shift in the
composition of the foreign born workers towards skilled ones points to the importance of
analyzing the impact of foreign born workers on skill premium dynamics.
2.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The objective in this section is to measure quantitatively how much the supply side factors
in Canadian labor markets accounted for the observed dynamics in skill premium for the
1981-2008 period. While analyzing the supply side, I emphasize particularly the role of an
increase in the relative share of total hours worked by skilled immigrants. The rst subsec-
tion discusses the model environment. The section following that explains the calibration
procedure. In the subsequent part, I present the model results for the skill premium between
1981 and 2008. In the last subsection I run some counterfactual experiments and discuss
their results.
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2.3.1 Model
The model is a partial equilibrium one where rms produce the nal good using skilled and
unskilled labor, capital equipment and capital structures a la KORV (2000)[50] as follows;
Yt = AtK

st[U

t + (1  ) fKet + (1  )St g

 ]
1 
 (2.1)
Dene Ht = [U t + (1  ) fKet + (1  )St g

 ]
1

Firms maximize their prots by choosing the amount of Ket; Kst; St and Ut they will use.
The rst order conditions of rms give the following wages for skilled and unskilled labor.
rst = 

Ht
Kst
1 
ret =  (1  ) (1  )KstH t K 1et fKet + (1  )St g


 1
rst = (1  ) (1  ) (1  )KstH1  t S 1t fKet + (1  )St g


 1
wut = (1  )KstH t U  1t
wst = (1  ) (1  ) (1  )KstH t S 1t fKet + (1  )St g


 1
The skill premium implied by the model is;
wst
wut
=
(1  ) (1  )

fKet + (1  )St g
 

S 1t
U  1t
(2.2)
By taking logs of equation (2.2) and di¤erentiating with respect to time we obtain the
following for the growth rate of skill premium;
g wst
wut
' (   1)g St
Ut
+ (   )gKet
St

Ket
St

(2.3)
here gx denotes the growth rate of the variable x.
The growth rate of the skill premium has two components, the growth rates of the relative
share of skilled employment (St
Ut
) and the capital equipment per skilled labor (Ket
St
): KORV
(2000)[50] identify the rst component as the "relative quantity e¤ect" and the second as
the "capital-skill complementarity e¤ect". Under the parameter restrictions that  < 1 and
 > ; the growth rate of the skill premium increases with increases in the growth rate of
capital equipment per skilled labor hours and declines with decreases in the growth rate of
the relative share of skilled employment.
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2.3.2 Calibration
I start the quantitative analysis by determining the parameters of the model. There are
5 parameters in the production function described in equation (2.1). These are share
parameters (; ; ) and the elasticity of substitution parameters (; ): I set  which is the
share of capital structures to 0.13 which is the value used by Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Krusell (1998).[?] There is range of estimates for (; ): KORV (2000)[50] use the U.S. data
and estimate  =  0:495: I set the value of  to its value as estimated by KORV (2000).[50]
;  and  are calibrated to match the average wage bill ratio, average labor share of income
and the average growth rate of the skill premium between 1981 and 2008. Table 5 lists the
parameters from outside sources and table 6 reports the calibrated parameters together with
their data moments.
Parameter Source
 =  0:495 KORV (2000)
 = 0:130 Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1998)
Table 5: Parameters from outside sources
Parameter Moment Data Value Model Value
 = 0:927  skill premium (1981-2008) 1.5% 1.5%
 = 0:939 Average labor share of income 62% 62%
 = 0:986 Average wage bill ratio 48% 48%
Table 6: Calibrated parameters and moments
2.3.3 Model Results
In this section I assess the performance of the model in explaining the evolution of relative
wage earnings of college graduates in Canada for the 1981-2008 period. I use the model
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parameters, the actual series for machinery and equipment capital stock Ket, the hours
worked by skilled and unskilled individuals St,Ut to obtain a predicted series for the college
premium

wst
wut

;using equation (2.2).
The data series for college education premium is compared with its model counterpart
in gure 1. Despite the fact that the model generated skill premium does not track each
data point, overall it captures the general stagnant behavior of the relative wage earnings of
college graduates between 1981 and 2008. To take a closer look at the performance of the
model, I report the change in the relative earnings of skilled workers in table 7. The model
predicts a slight rise by 1.7% in the skill premium between 1981 and 1991. In the data,
the college-educated individuals experienced a slight decline in their relative earnings by
1%. For the 1991-2001 period, skill premium displays 1.7% increase and the model predicts
this increase to be around 1% explaining around 56% of the slight increase observed in the
data. During the 2000s, the premium enjoyed by college-educated individuals remained
almost constant in Canada with a slight increase of 0.7% whereas the model predicts a slight
decline of -1.2% for that period. Although the predictions of the model for the direction
of the change in college premium are not the same as in the data for the 1981-1991 and
2001-2008 periods, since the magnitude of the change is very small both in the data and the
model, I can say that the model also does well in generating the sluggish movement of the
college premium for those periods.
Data Model
1981-1991 -1.0% 1.7%
1991-2001 1.7% 1.0%
2001-2008 0.7% -1.2%
Table 7: % change in the relative wage earnings of college graduates. Model vs. data
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Figure 1: Skill Premium 1981-2008: Model vs. data
To further analyze the dynamics of skill premium, I decompose the growth rate of skill
premium using equation (2.3). In the model the skill premium increases by nearly 1.5%
between 1981 and 2008. Decomposition of the change in skill premium shows that of the
total change, -6.8% is due to the increase in the relative share of college and above educated
workers. This implies that the capital skill complementarity worked in the opposite direction.
In other words, the machinery and equipment stock increased at a faster rate than the college-
educated workers. This observed increase in machinery and equipment stock compensated
for the negative impact of the relative quantity e¤ect on the skill premium.
An essential question to ask at his point is how much the inows of highly educated
immigrants took part in the decline in the skill premium. To nd this out, I further
decompose the relative quantity e¤ect into its native and foreign born components as follows5;
(
ST
UT
) = (
SM
UT
)
SM
ST
+(
SN
UT
)
SN
ST
Here ST denotes the total hours by skilled labor, SM is the hours worked by foreign born
skilled labor and SN is that by native skilled labor. The results of the decomposition exercise
summarized in table 9 show that the increase in college-educated immigrants contribute 35%
to the growth in the relative share of skilled labor and the decline in college premium between
5Details of the decomposition are in the appendix
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1981 and 2008. The increase in the relative share of native skilled is responsible for the
remaining 65% of the growth in the share of skilled labor and the decline in skill premium
between 1981 and 2008.
Growth rate components
gKe
S
0.22
g S
U
0.93
Relative quantity e¤ect -0.07
Capital-skill complementarity e¤ect 0.08
Table 8: Decomposition of the growth rate of skill premium
Contribution Contribution
 (log points) (log points) (%)
Total college/total non-college 0.93
Native college/total non-college 0.78 0.61 65%
Immigrant college/total non-college 1.38 0.32 35%
Table 9: Decomposition of the growth rate of college graduate hours relative to non-college
2.3.4 Counterfactual Scenarios
The objective in this section is to solve the model for Canada under some counterfactual
scenarios and observe the behavior of college education premium. The counterfactual sce-
narios are designed so as to understand how the change in the relative supply of college hours
among immigrants a¤ected the dynamics of skill premium. To accomplish this goal, I con-
duct two counterfactual experiments and simulate the model. The counterfactual scenarios
considered answer the following questions;
How would the skill premium in Canada evolve if
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1. the share of skilled hours among immigrants did not increase between 1981 and 2008
2. the share of skilled hours among immigrants grew at the same rate as in the U.S.
Table 10 reports the relative share of hours worked by college graduates under the coun-
terfactual scenarios. Under the rst counterfactual scenario, the increase in the relative
share of college graduate hours between 1981 and 2008 is 28% points lower than in the data.
In the second counterfactual economy where the relative share of college graduate hours
among immigrants increases at the same rate as in the U.S., the ratio of college-graduate to
non-college hours displays a 78% for the whole period. This is 15% points lower than the
one observed in the data. 2001-2008 is the period during which the ratio of hours worked by
college graduate to non-college immigrants increased the fastest, therefore the biggest dif-
ference in the growth rate of the relative college hours between the real and counterfactual
data occurs between those years.
Data Scenario 1 Scenario 2
1981-1991 31.2% 24.4% 27.9%
1991-2001 19.4% 19.4% 26.2%
2001-2008 43.0% 21.8% 24.7%
1981-2008 93.5% 65.7% 78.8%
Table 10: Change in relative share of college graduate hours under counterfactual scenarios
Going back to equation (2.3), the slower growth in college graduate hours relative to
non-college hours a¤ects the change in college education premium through two di¤erent
channels. Firstly a smaller growth rate in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor pulls up
the pace at which the relative wage earnings of the highly educated increases. This is
the relative quantity channel. Secondly as skilled hours increase more slowly relative to
unskilled, the machinery and equipment stock per skilled labor rises at a faster rate. This
is the capital-skill complementarity e¤ect which reinforces the increase in college education
premium.
The growth rate of college education premium is compared with the benchmark model in
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table 11. The results of the counterfactual scenario 1 report the change in college education
premium had the relative share of skilled hours among the foreign born labor force stayed
constant between 1981 and 2008. For all the decades between 1981 and 2008, the growth
rate of college education premium is higher than its data counterpart. The model predicts
that the college education premium will increase by nearly 9.7% as opposed to the 1.5%
change observed in the data when there is no change in the composition of hours worked by
immigrants. The results for the counterfactual scenario 2 are similar. If the growth rate in
the relative share of skilled among the foreign born in Canada were the same as in the U.S.,
the relative wage earnings of college graduates would grow by 5.9% throughout the whole
period. This is a 4.5% points improvement over the growth rate of skill premium observed
in the data which accounts for 25% of the di¤erence in growth rates of college education
premium between the two countries for the 1981 and 2008 period.
In both counterfactual scenarios there is an improvement in the sluggish behavior of the
college education premium which implies that the shift in the composition of immigrants
more towards college graduates had impacts on the relative return to higher education in
Canadian labor markets between 1981 and 2008.
Looking at each period separately during the rst decade, skilled wages increase fastest
under the counterfactual scenario 1. The rise in college education premium when there
is no change in the composition of immigrant hours, is around 2 times more than the one
predicted by the benchmark model. For the 1991-2001 period the change in relative hours
of college graduates observed in the data is almost the same as the one under the rst
counterfactual case, which leads to a slow rise in skill premium comparable to its benchmark
model value. The most signicant discrepancy between the predictions of the benchmark
model and counterfactual scenarios for the change in skill premium is observed during the
2001-2008 period. With no change in the skill composition of hours worked by immigrants,
the ratio of college to non-college hours increases by 22% instead of 43% as in the data.
With a smaller relative quantity e¤ect, the skill premium grows by 4.6%. This implies a
6% points improvement in college education premium compared to the benchmark model.
Similarly with the U.S. growth rate in the relative share of skilled to unskilled hours among
immigrants, the skill premium displays a 4% increase stemming from a slower growth in
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relative skilled hours.
Model Scenario 1 Scenario 2
1981-1991 1.7% 3.9% 2.7%
1991-2001 1.0% 1.2% -0.9%
2001-2008 -1.2% 4.6% 4.1%
1981-2008 1.5% 9.7% 5.9%
Table 11: Change in college education premium under counterfactual scenarios
2.4 CONCLUSION
Wage inequality between college graduates and the non-college has remained either stagnant
or declined in Canada between 1981 and 2008. This stagnant behavior of the college
premium is accompanied by an increase in skilled hours relative to unskilled. The increasing
weight of college graduates among total hours worked by immigrants is an important factor
contributing to the increase in the hours worked by college graduates. In this paper I make
a quantitative analysis of the impact of the growth in skilled hours among immigrants on
the college education premium in the country.
The model is a partial equilibrium one where rms produce output using skilled and
unskilled labor as well as two di¤erent types of capital - structures and capital - a la KORV
(2000)[50]. In the quantitative analysis part I use this production function, real stock of
machinery and equipment adjusted for quality changes and the composition adjusted hours
worked by college graduates and those with less than college education as skilled and unskilled
labor inputs and show that I can track the general stagnant behavior of college education
premium in Canada.
Having established the success of the model in explaining the overall dynamics of the
relative earnings of skilled workers, I simulate two counterfactual cases to evaluate the impact
of the rise in the share of college graduates among immigrants. The rst counterfactual
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scenario simulates an economy where the skill composition of immigrants stays at its 1981
level throughout the whole period. The results of this counterfactual experiment shows
that with no change in the share of hours worked by college-educated among immigrants,
the growth rate in skill premium is nearly 6 times higher than the one observed in the
data. The impact is especially remarkable for the 2001-2008 period which exhibits the
fastest growth in the skilled employment hours among immigrants. The relative wage
earnings of college-educated individuals increase by 4.6% as opposed to the -1.2% decline in
this counterfactual economy. The second counterfactual scenario illustrates the Canadian
economy in which the skill composition of hours worked by immigrants grows at the same
rate as in the U.S. College education premium increases by 5.9% between 1981 and 2008 in
this case. Compared to the data, this is a 4.5% points improvement in the relative wage
earnings of college graduates. This implies that the di¤erence between the growth in skilled
hours among immigrants experienced by two countries accounts for around 25% of the 17%
points larger increase in U.S. college premium.
The partial equilibrium modelling approach in this paper does not allow for changes
that might occur in the capital stock or skilled and unskilled labor in response to exogenous
shifts in the immigrant labor force. Analyzing the impacts of immigration in a general
equilibrium setting where the savings and education choices are endogenously determined is
an interesting extension of the model which is planned as future work.
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3.0 IMMIGRATION IN CANADA: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
ANALYSIS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Immigration is a highly debated issue among policy makers, researchers, and the public.
The immigrantsimpact on the native population of a country has been evaluated in many
aspects including wage and overall welfare changes as well as the burden or relief they create
for the scal system.1 The objective of this paper is to quantify the e¤ects of immigration
on Canadas native population using a general equilibrium model.
There are two remarkable features of Canadas immigrant population. The rst one is
that they constitute an important proportion of the total population and their share among
the total population has been increasing. According to 2006 Canadian Census data, the
foreign born constituted almost 20% of the total population, a 5% points increase since the
beginning of the 1980s.2 The second distinguishing feature of the immigrant population
in Canada is the increase in the relative share of college-educated individuals. The increase
in the proportion of college graduates among the immigrant population is an outcome of the
selective immigration policy enacted in 1967. The 1967 Immigration Act introduced the
points system as a tool to select immigrants into the country. In a points system, immigrants
are admitted to the country based on the points they collect according to their education,
age, language and other qualications.3 Soon after the implementation of the new policy,
1Card, D. (1990, 2001), Altonji, J., Card, D. (1991), use spatial approaches to estimate the impacts of
immigrants on the wage and employment of natives in the U.S. Borjas, G. (1994,2003), Borjas, G., Freeman
R., Katz, L. (1992, 1996, 1997), Aydemir, A., Borjas, G. (2007) are nationwide analyses of the labor market
impacts of immigration. Storesletten (2003) evaluates the scal impacts of immigrants.
2Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-Born population, 2006 Census.
3Green, Alan G., Green, David A: "The Economic Goals of Canadas Immigration Policy: Past and
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there was an increase in the share of the highly educated among the immigrant population
in Canada. A comparison of the intended occupational groups of the incoming immigrants
in 1966 and 1977 shows that the total share of professional and managerial workers and
clerical, commercial and nancial laborers increased from 43% to 52% between those years.
These are the occupation groups which require the highest level of education.4
A rigorous evaluation of the post 1967 immigration experience of Canada in terms of how
it a¤ects the welfare, income, and human and physical capital of natives is important since
a similar candidate immigration policy is being considered in other developed countries.
The most recent example of such countries is France. In 2007, a new immigration law
which gives the government new powers to encourage high skilled immigration took e¤ect in
the country. Among the main objectives of the new policy are recruiting skilled workers,
facilitating foreign studentsstay and tightening the rules on family reunication.5
To analyze the impacts of immigration, I develop a heterogenous agent OLG model in
the tradition of Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987)[3]. Native individuals are heterogenous with
respect to their ability levels, and they make a discrete college decision at the beginning of
their lives in the model. The ability level of a native individual determines his schooling
decision as well as the e¢ ciency units of labor he provides as either a skilled or an unskilled
worker. Immigration a¤ects the native population through its direct and indirect impacts
on prices and the tax rate in the economy. For example an inux of immigrants which
increases the proportion of college graduates among the immigrant population, as in Canada,
is a positive supply shock to college-educated labor, which decreases the wage level for this
group. On the other hand, unskilled labor and physical capital become relatively more
scarce, therefore the return on these factors increases.
Immigration also alters the factor returns indirectly through two channels. The rst
is the human capital channel. The inow of skilled immigrants discourages some natives
from enrolling in college and leaves only the higher ability ones with a college education.
In other words, both the number and the average ability level of skilled and unskilled labor
Present"
4Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada. http://www.cic.gc.ca, Citizenship and Immigration Sta-
tistics Archives.
5Source: Murphy, Kara. "Frances New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled".
Migration Policy Institute, November 2006.
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change in response to an increase in the proportion of college-graduate immigrants. Another
indirect channel through which immigration a¤ects prices is the physical capital channel.
Immigrants arrive in the country with low asset holdings, so their inow dilutes the physical
capital stock.6 The lower per capita physical capital changes the interest rates, hence the
saving decision of natives.
In my quantitative analysis, I evaluate the impact of changes in the immigrant population
that took place in Canada between 1981 and 2008. I run two counterfactual experiments
to assess the implications of an increase in the share of immigrants and the shift in their
composition towards college graduates for the native population. My ndings suggest that
an increasing share of immigrants with a shift in their composition, as observed in Canada,
results in a decline in the college attainment rate among natives. The results from the
counterfactual experiments show that the increase in the relative share of college graduates
among immigrants is the main reason for natives being discouraged from college education.
Almost 7 in every 100 native Canadians opt out of college education due to the change
in the composition of the immigrant population. Besides decreasing enrollment in college
education, the model predicts that immigration accounts for around 2% of the increase in
the college premium among natives between 1981 and 2008. Interestingly, the shift in the
composition of immigrants towards college graduates alone increases the college premium
slightly. This result is di¤erent from the results of the static models which predict that
the inow of highly educated immigrants to Canada decreases the wage inequality between
college graduates and those with less than college education in the country.7 The reason
for this di¤erence is the reoptimization of the schooling decision by natives. The decline in
college attainment among natives in response to having more college-educated immigrants
o¤sets the negative impact of the shift in the composition of immigrants on the relative
earnings of college graduates. This is due to the fact that a smaller share of the native
population with a higher average ability remains as college graduate.
The overall impact of immigration on the native population are also evaluated by quan-
tifying its welfare e¤ects. The welfare analysis in the paper rst compares the 2008 econ-
6The median amount of savings by all immigrants in 2001 is reported as $15,000. Source: Longitudinal
Survey of Immigrants to Canada : A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences (2005)
7See Aydemir and Borjas (2007).
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omy with a counterfactual one in which the immigrant population keeps its 1981 share and
composition. Unlike Borjas (1994)[11], which predicts an immigration surplus accruing to
natives, I nd that the change in the immigrant population created a welfare loss for natives
in Canada. Based on the results of counterfactual experiments, I conclude that the main
driver of the welfare loss is the increase in the size of the immigrant population. On the
other hand, the shift in the composition of immigrants towards college graduates creates a
small net welfare gain to natives, which amounts to an approximately 0.02% increase in the
permanent consumption of both college graduate and high school graduate natives at the
top, bottom and middle of the ability distribution.
A brief look at the literature that studies the impacts of immigrants on the earnings
of natives shows that there is conicting evidence. The spatial approach makes use of
the variation in the immigrant inows in local labor markets to estimate the impacts of
immigration. Altonji and Card (1991)[2] treat immigrants and natives as two factors of
production, whereas Card (1990, 2001)([21],[22])assume that immigrants and natives of the
same skill group are perfect substitutes. These studies nd a small impact of immigrants
on the wages of natives. On the other hand, research that use a nation-wide approach nd
signicant and negative impacts of immigration on native earnings. For instance, Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1997)[14] and Borjas (2003)[13] estimate the impact of immigration on
natives of di¤erent education and experience groups. These studies nd a larger and negative
impact of immigration on the wage earnings of the natives. Similarly, Aydemir and Borjas
(2007)[5] compare the impact of immigration induced labor supply shocks on the relative
earnings of natives in di¤erent education groups in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Their
results suggest that the immigration experience of Canada narrowed the wage inequality due
to the high proportion of skilled immigrants. For the U.S., they conclude that the wage
inequality increased as a result of immigration since the immigrant population consists more
of low-skilled individuals.
In addition to these studies, there are several which evaluate the e¤ects of immigration
with a general equilibrium model. Ben-Gad (2004, 2008)([7],[8]) nd the wage and welfare
impacts of immigration to be lower than the static models. Storesletten (2003)[73] analyzes
the scal impacts of di¤erent education levels of immigrants and concludes that high skilled
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immigration can be used to ease the scal burden of an ageing population. A common feature
of these papers is that physical capital is endogenous; however, human capital is either absent
or exogenous. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)[42] investigate the role of immigration
in explaining the increasing wage inequality observed in the U.S. during the 1980s. They
extend the Ben-Porath framework by adding heterogeneous agents and endogenous human
capital accumulation. Their results suggest that immigration does not have a signicant
impact on wage inequality. Eberhard (2011)[31] develops a model with endogenous human
capital but he precludes physical capital in his setting. He nds that unexpected immigration
shocks have a positive and larger impact on the earnings of individuals through human capital
accumulation and educational attainment of natives compared to a smaller and negative
direct e¤ect. My paper is di¤erent from these two papers in the way human capital choice
is modeled. In both Heckman et al. (1998)[42] and Eberhard (2011)[31], the human capital
decision is a continuous one, whereas in my model individuals of di¤erent ability levels make
a discrete college decision. This specication allows me to compare the college attainment
rates in the model with the data and assess immigrantsimpact on the education decision
of natives in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the data and
section 3.3 describes the model. In section 3.4, parameters of the model are explained.
Section 3.5 contains the results of the calibration and the benchmark economy in 1981. The
following section discusses the counterfactual experiments and section 3.7 o¤ers a conclusion.
3.2 DATA
In this section, I present some data for the 1981-2008 period.8 As mentioned previously,
there are two important observations about the immigrant population in Canada. The rst
one is the increase in the relative share of immigrants among the total population. The
8I make use of two di¤erent micro data sets for my analysis. The rst one is the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), which contains information on individuals aged 15 years and over for the 1981-1997 period.
The second one is the Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics (SLID), which covers the 1993-2008 period.
The sample consists of employed wage and salary workers between ages 18 and 65, and retired individuals
above 65. I am interested in immigrants who have acquired all their education before arriving in Canada
therefore, I exclude immigrants below age 22 from my sample.
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second one is the simultaneous shift in the immigrant population towards college graduates.
Table 12, panel A reports the relative share of the immigrants in the sample as well as the
proportion of college graduates among the immigrants.9
Panel A: Stock of immigrants
Relative share of immigrants % college graduate immigrants
Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
1981 20% 7% 12% 17%
1991 18% 9% 17% 21%
2001 28% 12% 18% 25%
2008 31% 15% 30% 27%
Panel B: Inows of immigrants
Entry period % college graduate immigrants
1961-1971 14%
1971-1981 18%
1981-1991 20%
1991-2001 36%
2000-2008 44%
Table 12: Stock and ow of immigrants
Between 1981 and 2008, the relative share of immigrants among the sample increased
from 20% to 30%. The increase in the share of immigrants occurred mostly after the 1990s.
On the other hand, the increase in the relative share of college graduates among immigrants
happened throughout the whole period. College-graduate immigrants constitute 12% of
immigrants in the 1981 sample. The same ratio is 30% for the 2008 sample of immigrants.
Comparing these numbers with the U.S. data shows that in Canada, immigrants are a greater
proportion of the total population and the relative share of college graduates increased at a
faster rate between 1981 and 2008.
9More detailed information about how the two education groups-college graduates and less than college
graduates- are constructed both for SCF and SLID data is provided in the appendix.
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Panel B presents the relative share of college graduates among the immigrants that inow
to the economy in the designated periods. Among the immigrants that came to Canada
between 1961 and 1971, 14% were college graduates. This ratio increased to 44% among the
immigrants who entered the country between 2000 and 2008. This fact illustrates a shift in
the educational prole of immigrants towards more college graduates in the country.
One objective of this paper is to assess the impacts of observed changes in the immigrant
population on the wage earnings of natives. In particular, I am interested in how the
shift in the composition of the immigrant labor force a¤ected the relative earnings of college-
graduate natives in the country. Table 13 below reports the relative share of college graduates
among the native population and the college premium. The college premium in the country
increased by nearly 8% between 1981 and 2008. Meanwhile the share of college graduates
among the native population also increased from 8.6% to 24.4%. A relevant question to
ask here is how much of an impact immigration in Canada had on the relative earnings of
college graduates and their share among the natives.10
College premium % college graduates
1981 0.34 8.6%
1991 0.36 13.3%
2001 0.39 19.4%
2008 0.42 24.4%
Table 13: Log wage gap between college graduate and less than college graduate natives and
the share of college graduates among natives
10The college premium among natives is calculated using full-time full-year wage and salary workers
between ages 18 and 65. I follow Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) denition of 40+ weeks in a year, for full
year workers. 30+ hours of work per week is the criterion for a full time worker based on Statistics Canadas
denition (http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/71-222-x/2008001/glossary-glossaire-eng.htm#a21) Workers with
an hourly wage of less than $1 are also dropped from the sample. To compute the college premium, I regress
log hourly wages on age, age-squared, a sex dummy and a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
is a college graduate or not. The college premium is measured as the coe¢ cient of the college graduate
dummy in this regression.
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3.3 MODEL
The model is a 68 period OLG model which incorporates the discrete college education
decision of individuals in an environment where there is investment specic technological
change and immigration ows. The natives are heterogeneous with respect to innate ability.
The ability level of an individual a¤ects his college decision and the human capital he will
provide in the labor market. Individuals make their college choice in period 1 of their lives,
which corresponds to age 18. They retire at the age of 65 and die when they are 85.
3.3.1 Individuals Problem
Preferences
Natives
An individual born at time t chooses fcn;ej;s ; kn;ej+1;s+1g to maximize the discounted value of
life time utility given by
max
fcn;ej;s ;kn;ej+1;s+1g
JX
j=1
j 1u(cn;ej;s ) (3.1)
subject to his budget constraints.
The index j = 1; ::J denotes the age, n denotes nativity status, e 2 fc = college
graduate; h = high school graduateg indicates the education level of the individual and
s = t+ j   1 is the time index.
Each individual chooses whether or not to go to college at the beginning of his life. If he
chooses e = h, he starts working immediately until the retirement age j. If he chooses to
go to college, he spends the rst four years at school, then starts working as a skilled worker.
Accordingly, for e = c; the budget constraints of the individual born at time t are
cn;cj;s + k
n;c
j+1;s+1 + Ts  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1))kn;cj;s for j = 1; ::4; (3.2a)
cn;cj;s + k
n;c
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1))kn;cj;s + (1   l)wcsa"n;cj for j = 5; ::j (3.2b)
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cn;cj;s + k
n;c
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1))kn;cj;s + bn;cj;s for j = j + 1; :::J: (3.2c)
for e = h the budget constraints are
cn;hj;s + k
n;h
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1))kn;hj;s + (1   l)whsa"n;hj for j = 1; ::j (3.3a)
cn;hj;s + k
n;h
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1))kn;hj;s + bn;hj;s for j = j + 1; :::J: (3.3b)
I dene bn;hj as the social security benets, "
n;c
j ; "
n;h
j as the age specic e¢ ciencies for the two
education groups, and r; wc; wh as returns on capital, and two types of labor,  k and  l as
tax rates on capital and labor income. T is the tuition cost that an individual needs to pay
to get college education.
Immigrants
Similar to Heckman et al. (1998)[42], immigrants are assumed to enter the economy past
their schooling age.11 I assign an average ability level acm and a
h
m to college-graduate and
less than college-educated immigrants and exempt from an ability distribution among them.
Based on these, the life-time utility maximization problem of an immigrant who enters the
economy in period t is given by
max
fcm;ej;s ;km;ej+1;s+1g
JX
j=23
j 1u(cm;ej;s )
subject to his budget constraints. Here the time index is s = t+ j  23 and m indicates that
the individual is an immigrant. The budget constraints of a college graduate immigrant are
cm;cj;s + k
m;c
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1)km;cj;s + (1   l)wcsacm"m;cj for j = 23; ::j (3.4a)
cm;cj;s + k
m;c
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1)km;cj;s + bm;cj;s for j = j + 1; :::J (3.4b)
11For simplicity, I assume that all immigrants that inow to the economy are at age 40 which corresponds
to age 23 in the model. This is the median age of a sample of immigrants above age 22 in the data which
is constant between 1981 and 2008.
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Similarly the budget constraints of an immigrant with less than college education take the
form
cm;hj;s + k
m;h
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1)km;hj;s + (1   l)whsahm"m;hj for j = 23; ::j (3.5a)
cm;hj;s + k
m;h
j+1;s+1  ((1   k)(rs   ) + 1)km;hj;s + bm;hj;s for j = j + 1; :::J (3.5b)
Schooling Choice
Natives
In the model, natives make a discrete college decision at the beginning of their lives.
This decision is made by comparing the lifetime utility of being a college graduate and that
of remaining a high school graduate.
Let V ej;t(a; k
n;e
j;t ) denote the value of lifetime utility of a native individual who is j years
old at time t. If the individual is a college graduate (e = c); the recursive representation of
his utility maximization problem is as follows
V cj;s(a; k
n;c
j;s ) = maxfcn;cj;s ;kn;cj+1;s+1g
u(cn;cj;s ) + V
c
j+1;s+1(a; k
n;c
j+1;s+1)
for s = t+ j   1 subject to equations (3.2a-3.2c)
If the individual opts not to enroll in college (e = h), then the corresponding value
function to his lifetime utility maximization problem is
V hj;s(a; k
n;h
j;s ) = max
fcn;hj;s ;kn;hj+1;s+1g
u(cn;hj;s ) + Vj+1;s+1(a; k
n;h
j+1;s+1)
subject to equations (3.3a) and (3.3b).
Individuals solve their perfect foresight utility maximization problem using backward
induction. Going back to age 1, the college choice of an individual with ability level a can
be characterized by the following conditions
V c1;t(a; k
n;c
1;t ) > V
h
1;t(a; k
n;h
1;t ) choose e = c,
V h1;t(a; k
n;h
1;t ) > V
c
1;t(a; k
n;c
1;t ) choose e = h (3.6)
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V h1;t(a; k
n;h
1;t ) = V
c
1;t(a; k
n;c
1;t ) indi¤erent
There is a unique threshold ability level at which makes an individual indi¤erent between
getting a college education and remaining a high school graduate 8t:
3.3.2 Demographics
In each period, a new birth cohort of natives enters the economy. The new born natives
replace the old cohort who left the economy one period before. It is the inow of immigrants
in period t: I denote the the time t native population stock of age j by Nj;t, the immigrant
population stock of age j by Mj;t; and the total population by Pt. Using these I get the
following equations for the law of motion for population.
N1;t+1 = NJ;t +MJ;t
M23;t+1 = It+1
Pt =
JX
j=1
Nj;t +
JX
j=23
Mj;t
Pt+1 = Pt + It+1 (3.7)
The shares of immigrants and natives of all ages are dened as follows;
nj+1;t+1 =
Nj+1;t+1
Pt+1
=
nj;t
(1 + it+1)
; n1;t+1 =
nJ;t +mJ;t
(1 + it+1)
8j = 1; ::J   1 (3.8)
mj+1;t+1 =
Mj+1;t+1
Pt+1
=
mj;t
(1 + it+1)
; m23;t+1 =
it+1
(1 + it+1)
8j = 23; ::J   1 (3.9a)
where it+1 =
It+1
Pt
Using the denition of age shares of immigrants, the share of college-graduate and less
than college-graduate immigrants at each age are given by;
mcj;t = {ct j+23mj;t
mhj;t = {ht j+23mj;t 8j = 23; ::J   1
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where {ct j+23 and {ht j+23 denote the share of college graduates and less than college grad-
uates among median age immigrants who arrived in period (t  j + 23); respectively.
3.3.3 Firms Problem
3.3.3.1 Production Technology The production technology in the model has the fea-
ture of complementarity between skilled labor and capital equipment a la Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull and Violante (2000)[50]. The production function is a nested CES aggregate of
skilled and unskilled labor and capital as follows
Yt = [U

t + (1  ) f(Kt) + (1  )(St)g

 ]
1
 (3.10)
In this setting,  <  implies a complementarity between capital and skilled labor and ( )
measures the degree of complementarity.
The law of motion for the physical capital stock in the economy is;
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + Itqt
Here qt represents the state of the technology for producing physical capital and it determines
the amount of capital which can be purchased with one unit of consumption good. Hence
1=qt is the relative price of physical capital in terms of the consumption good.
An alternative formulation of the environment with declining relative price of equipment
has been developed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997)[34]. In this alternative for-
mulation, the relative price of capital equipment is constant but its productivity is increasing
over time. Using transformed variables, the law of motion for capital equipment and the
production function is given by;
eKt+1 = (1  e) eKt + It where (1  e) = (1  )qt 1
qt
; and eKt = Kt
qt 1
The production function can be rewritten as;
Yt = [U

t + (1  ) f( eKt)(qt 1) + (1  )(St)g  ] 1 (3.11)
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The rms prot maximization problem gives the following rst order conditions;
rt =  (1  ) eK 1t Y 1 t (qt 1)f(qt 1 eKt) + (1  )St g  1
wct = (1  )(1  )Y 1 t f(qt 1 eKt) + (1  )Stg  1S 1t (3.12)
wht = Y
1 
t U
 1
t
3.3.3.2 Aggregation of Human and Physical Capital The production technology
in equation (3.11) uses skilled and unskilled labor as well as capital equipment to produce
output. Skilled labor is the aggregate human capital by college graduates and unskilled
labor is the aggregate human capital by individuals who have less than a college education.
The formulation of aggregate skilled labor is
St =
jX
j=5
Nj;t
Z 1
at j+1
af(a)da+
jX
j=23
M cj;ta
c
m (3.13)
Individuals with less than college education start working immediately. Hence the human
capital provided by these individuals is
Ut =
jX
j=1
Nj;t
Z
0
at j+1
af(a)da+
jX
j=23
Mhj;ta
h
m (3.14)
Aggregate physical capital at time t is equal to the sum of age-specic assets by natives and
immigrants i.e.
Kt = K
N
t +K
M
t where (3.15)
KNt =
JX
j=2
Nj;t
Z 1
at j+1
knj;t(a)f(a)da+
JX
j=2
Nj;t
Z
0
at j+1
knj;t(a)f(a)da
KMt =
JX
j=23
M cj;tk
m
j;t +
JX
j=23
Mhj;tk
m
j;t (3.16)
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3.3.4 Government
3.3.4.1 Social Security I follow Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1999)[48] and
Chen, Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu (2007)[24] and assume that each individual receives a cer-
tain portion ( ) of their average life time wage income as social security benets. Ac-
cordingly the social security benets of a native individual during his retirement years is as
follows
bn;ej0;t+j0 1 =
 1
j
jP
j=1
wht+j 1a"
n;h
j if e = h
 1
j 4
jP
j=5
wct+j 1a"
n;c
j if e = c
9>>>=>>>; for j
0 = j + 1; ::J
For immigrants, the same social security income is dened as
bm;ej0;t+j0 23 =
 1
j 22
jP
j=23
wht+j 1a
h
m"
m;h
j for high school graduates
 1
j 22
jP
j=23
wct+j 1a
c
m"
m;c
j for college graduates
9>>>=>>>; for j
0 = j + 1; ::J
The social security program is funded by the government. Tax revenue is used to nance the
social security payments and government expenditures. The governments budget equation
is expressed in equation (3.17) below.
Gt +Bt =  l(w
c
tSt + w
h
t Ut) +  k(rt   )Kt (3.17)
where
Gt = Yt (3.18)
Bt =
JX
f
j0=j+1
nhj0;t
Z
0
a
t j0+1
bn;hj0;t(a)f(a)da+ n
c
j0;t
Z
a
t j0+1
1
bn;cj0;t(a)f(a)da
+mhj0;tb
m;h
j0;t +m
c
j0;tb
m;c
j0;t g
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3.3.5 Denition of Equilibrium
Given the exogenous share of each age group among natives fnj;tg and immigrants fmj;tg,
government policy parameters f;  ;  l;  kg; the exogenous price of capital equipment rela-
tive to consumption goods fqtg; and college tuition fees fTtg; a competitive equilibrium is
represented by a sequence of factor returns fwct ; wht ; rtg and a threshold ability level fatg; con-
sumption and saving choices of all individuals fcn;ej;t (a); kn;ej+1;t+1(a); cm;ej;t ; km;ej+1;t+1g such that;
1. The consumption and saving choices fcn;ej;t (a); kn;ej+1;t+1(a); cm;ej;t ; km;ej+1;t+1g solve the individ-
uals utility maximization problem subject to budget constraints (3.2a-3.2c), (3.3a-3.3b),
(3.4a-3.4b), (3.5a-3.5b).
2. The threshold ability fatg satises the indi¤erence condition in equation (3.6)
3. Prices fwct ; wht ; rtg satisfy the rst order conditions of the rms prot maximization
problem stated in (3.12)
4. Aggregate physical capital and human capital by unskilled and skilled labor in e¢ ciency
units are consistent with individual behaviors as stated in equations (3.13), (3.14) and
(3.15)
5. Governments budget constraint in equation (3.17) is satised.
6. Goods market clears.
Ct + It + Tt +Gt = Yt
where
Ct =
JX
j=1
Nj;t
Z 1
at j+1
cn;cj;t (a)f(a)da+
JX
j=1
Nj;t
Z
0
at j+1
cn;hj;t (a)f(a)da+
JX
j=23
M cj;tc
m;c
j;t +
JX
j=23
Mhj;tc
m;h
j;t
Tt =
4X
j=1
Nj;t[1  F (at j+1)]Tt
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3.3.6 Steady State
The model presented above is representative of the Canadian economy in which there are
constant inows of immigrants. The steady state can be characterized by the case in which
the share of the foreign born population remains constant with continued inows of immi-
grants to the economy i.e.,
Mt+1
Pt+1
=
Mt
Pt
= { (3.19)
This equality implies a constant growth rate of the population. Using (3.7), the growth rate
of the population is given by;
Pt+1
Pt
= 1 +
It+1
Pt
= 1 + g
The relation between g and { is the following;
g =
m
J
1  { (3.20)
where m
J
=
MJ;t
Pt
8t: A stationary demographic structure requires that the age shares are
constant i.e., mj;t = mj;t+1 8t: Using this condition and the age shares dened for immigrants
and natives in equations (??) and (3.9a), I get the following;
m23 =
g
(1 + g)
; mj+1 =
mj
(1 + g)
8j = 23; :::J   1 (3.21)
mJ =
g
(1 + g)J 22
Inserting mJ in equation (3.20), the growth rate of the population is found as;
g =

1
1  {
(1=(J 22))
  1 (3.22)
The share of native age groups are;
n1 =
nJ +mJ
(1 + g)
; nj+1 =
nj
(1 + g)
8j = 1; :::J   1 (3.23)
n
J
=
mJ
((1 + g)J   1)
A stationary equilibrium is characterized by the system of equations where all variables are
expressed in per capita terms and the growth rate of the population is as dened in equation
(3.22).
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3.4 MODEL PARAMETERS
The initial steady state of the model economy is calibrated to match some data moments
of the Canadian economy at the beginning of the 1980s. The 1981 Survey of Consumer
Finances Microdata set is used to calculate the data moments at the initial steady state
unless otherwise stated. Model parameters can be classied into the following groups.
3.4.1 Production function parameters.
The share parameters f; g and the elasticity of substitution parameters f; g are the
production function parameters which need to be specied. I set  =  0:495 which is the
value estimated by Krusell et al. (2000)[50] using the U.S. data. For ; there is a range
of estimates. Du¤y, Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2004)[29] use a panel of countries
and estimate  to be around 0.8, while Krusell et al. (2000)s estimate for this parameter is
0.401. Silos and Polgreen (2008)[70] estimate the same parameter to be 0.89. The value
I pick for  is 0:695 which is the average of these estimates.  is calibrated to match the
relative share of college graduates among natives. College graduates are 8.6% of the the
native population in 1981 as reported in table 18.  is chosen to match the income share of
capital which is around 62% at the beginning of 1980s.12
3.4.2 Parameters of the ability distribution of natives
The ability distribution of natives is log normal with parameters m; v: i.e. a 2 F (a) 
logN(m; v). I normalize the mean of the ability distribution to 1 and calibrate the dispersion
of the distribution to match the log di¤erence between the hourly earnings of the native
individual at the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile in 1981.13 The log (P90/P10)
value in the data is 1.32, meaning the individual at the top decile earns 132% more than the
one at the bottom decile.
12Source: OECDStat, www.stats.oecd.org
13To compute this measure, I select the full-time full year wage and salary workers between ages 18 and
65.
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3.4.3 Government Expenditure Parameters and Tax Rates
The condition for a balanced government budget is presented in equation (3.17). The
government expenditures in in this equation is a constant fraction of output as follows:
Gt = Yt
The parameter  is set to the average share of government expenditures in Canadian total
output between 1980 and 1990.14 The other component of the government budget is social
security benets. I refer to Gruber (1999)[36] to calibrate the replacement rate ( ) i.e.,
the fraction of average income which is paid out to an individual upon his retirement.15
Gruber (1999)[36] computes the expected net present discounted value of Social Security
Wealth which includes future entitlements from the four main social security programs in
Canada. Using the median earnings history of a synthetic cohort from 1973-1993 SCF data,
he calculates the replacement rates for all ages between 55 and 70.16 I set  to 0.375, which
are the replacement rates reported for a single individual with asset income at the age of 65.
The revenue of government comes from taxes on labor  l, and capital income  k: Mc-
Daniel (2007)[57] computes the average tax rate on labor and capital income for 15 OECD
countries for the 1950-2000 period. Based on her calculations for Canada, I set  k = 0:285
and pick  l so that the government budget constraint in equation (3.17) is satised.
3.4.4 Parameters Related to Demographics
Equation (3.22) gives the long run population growth rate as a function of the share of
immigrant stock { in the total population. To pin down {; I select the sample of immigrants
who are aged between 22 and 85 from SCF 1981 data and nd the sum of their relative
weight in the total population. With the value of { specied, the age shares of natives and
14Source: OECDStat: "National Accounts at a Glance"
15Gruber (1997) provides a brief summary of Canadas public pension plans. The public pension plans
for seniors can be categorized under two main groups. The rst one is the Old Age Security Program which
includes the Old Age Security Pension and Guaranteed Income Supplement. The other category is the
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans.
16In the paper the social security wealth is calculated by projecting all benets out until the age of 100
and then taking a weighted sum which discounts future benets by both the individual discount rate and
the prospects that the worker will live to a given future age. The results are presented in tables 1-6.
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immigrants can be calculated as a function of the population growth rate using equations
(3.21) and (3.23).
3.4.5 Parameters Related to Immigration
Average ability level: The model exempts from an ability distribution for immigrants.
All the college-educated immigrants are assigned an average ability level of acm and the ones
with less than a college education have an average ability level of ahm: These average ability
levels are calibrated to match the average wage gap between natives and immigrants of the
same education level. The model implied average wage of college-graduate and less than
college-educated natives and immigrants are given by the following equations;
wn;c = wc:
Z
a
1
af(a)
1
1  F (a)dai
wn;h = wh:
Z
0
a
af(a)
1
F (a)
da
wm;c = wc:acm
wm;h = wh:ahm
so the log wage gap between college-graduate natives and immigrants is;
ln(
wn;c
wm;c
) = ln
0@
R
a
1
aif(ai)
1
1 F (a)da
acm
1A
similarly the log wage gap between less than college-educated natives and immigrants is;
ln(
wn;h
wm;h
) = ln
0B@
R
0
a
af(a) 1
F (a)da
ahm
1CA
The log wage gap between college-educated and less than college-educated natives and im-
migrants is found by regressing log hourly wages on age, age squared, a dummy variable for
males and a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a native. Table 14 presents
the results of these regressions for the college-educated and the less than college-educated
respectively.
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Education group Log wage ratio
College graduates 0.034
Less than college graduates 0.029
Table 14: Wage gap between natives and immigrants
The initial assets of immigrants: Immigrants are assumed to arrive with a certain
amount of savings in the model. Considering the current regulations for immigration in
Canada, this is a reasonable assumption. Citizenship and Immigration to Canada (CIC) lists
"having enough money to support yourself and your dependents after you arrive in Canada"
as one of the criteria to be admitted as a skilled worker and professional immigrant.17 The
minimum amount required by CIC during the initial settlement period is set as $9,420
for a single individual by (CIC).18 According to a research paper by Statistics of Canada
based on the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants 2001, three quarters of immigrants brought
savings to the country upon their arrival. The median amount of savings by federal skilled
workers is reported as $15,000 in the paper.19 I assume that the median amount of savings
did not change signicantly from 1981 to 2001. This assumption allows me to nd the
median amount of savings by immigrants in 1981 as $7,600 in 1981 dollars. I calibrate
the immigrants initial assets as a fraction  of the average labor earnings the immigrant
individuals. The median amount of savings is nearly 38.7% of the average wage income of
FTFY foreign born workers in 1981 therefore I set  = 0:387:
3.4.6 Tuition Costs
Information on average undergraduate fees is available through Statistics Canada, Centre for
Education Statistics. TLAC (tuition and living accommodation) data, available through
the Centre, provides weighted average tuition fees for full-time Canadian undergraduate
17http://www.cic.gc.ca, Immigrating to Canada.
18"Skilled Worker Class: Will you qualify? : Proof of funds", CIC (2004) quoted from "Asset-Based
Approaches to Settlement Services in Canada" Jennifer Robson-Haddow and Sam Ladner
19Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences, Statistics
Canada. Catalogue no. 89-614-XIE
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students. To calibrate the tuition costs in the model, I compute the ratio of the average
tuition costs to the annual average wage earnings of individuals of age 18 who opt not to
enroll in college and start working for wages. The ratio of the average undergraduate tuition
fees to the average annual wage earnings of 18 year old FTFY wage and salary workers in
the data is calculated as 9.02%. Hence I set the tuition parameter  to 0:0902:
3.4.7 Other Parameters
The remaining parameters are the discount factor ; the CRRA parameter , the depreciation
rate for physical capital ; and the initial relative price of capital equipment 1=qo: The
discount factor  is calibrated to match an average annual interest rate of 4%. I set
the CRRA parameter  to 1.5, which is a common value in the literature. I borrow the
depreciation rate of capital from Li, Rao and Tang (2010)[54]. They report the depreciation
rate used by Statistics Canada for aggregate physical capital as 0.16. Lastly the relative
price of capital equipment in 1981, 1=qo, is normalized to 1.
3.5 CALIBRATION AND STEADY STATE RESULTS
In this section, I report the calibration results of the model and assess the models perfor-
mance in explaining some macro variables of the Canadian economy at the beginning of the
1980s. Table 15 summarizes the model parameters borrowed from outside sources and table
16 presents the calibrated parameters along with the targeted data moments. The results
in table 16 suggest that the model does well in matching the data moments. The share of
college-educated natives constitutes 8.62% of the native population. The model predicts the
same ratio to be 9%. The variance of log normal ability distribution is calibrated as 0.45,
which matches the overall income inequality measured by log (P90/P10) ratio. According
to 1981 SCF data, the 90th percentile earns 132% more than the 10th percentile in hourly
wages. In the model the log (P90/P10) ratio is 1.28 meaning 128% di¤erential between the
hourly wage earnings of the 90th and 10th percentile.
Table 17 reports some data moments which are not matched by construction. These
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Parameter Source
m =-0.101 Normalization
 =0.695 Mean value of estimates
 =-0.495 Krusell et al. (2000)
 k =28.5% McDaniel (2007)
 =0.22 OECDStat
 =0.375 Gruber (1999)
{ =20% SCF 1981
J =48(age 65) Gruber (1999)
{c =12% SCF 1981
 =9.02% TLAC (1981)
 =0.16 Tang, Rao and Li (2010)
 =1.5 Common Value
 =0.387 StatCan
Table 15: Model parameters from outside sources
Parameter Moment Data Model
 = 0:56 Share of college graduates among natives 8.60% 9.00%
 = 0:897 Income share of capital 38.00% 38.00%
 = 0:987 Interest Rate (after tax) 4.00% 4.10%
v = 0:45 log P90/P10 ratio 1.32 1.28
acm = 2:002 Log wage gap-native and immigrants, college graduates 0.03 0.03
ahm = 0:867 Log wage gap-native and immigrants, less than college 0.03 0.03
g = 0:49% The share of immigrant stock (age 22) 20.00% 20.00%
Table 16: Calibrated parameters and target moments
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data moments are the wage bill ratio between college-graduate and less than college-graduate
natives, capital output ratio, consumption output ratio, as well as some income inequality
measures.
The model produces a wage bill ratio of 23% between college-educated and less than
college-educated natives. The same ratio is 23.3% in the data. The average capital output
ratio between 1972 and 1993 for the business sector in Canada is reported as 1.4 by Bentolila
and Gilles (2003)[9]. The capital output ratio in the model economy is 1.75, which is close
to its data value. Another important macro aggregate is the share of consumption in total
output. Statistics Canada reports the 1981 share of consumption expenditures among total
output as 52.8%. The initial steady state of the model produces a value of 43.4% capturing
82% of the share of consumption in the data.
The heterogeneity of individuals with respect to ability and education in the model
provides the opportunity to study overall income inequality as well as inequality within
education groups for the native population. Table 17 reports two non-targeted measures of
overall income inequality, which are the log wage gap between the 90th and 50th percentiles
and the 50th and 10th percentiles. The results for these two income inequality measures
suggest that the model explains an important portion of the income inequality at the upper
and lower tails of income distribution among natives. The model value for the log (P90/P50)
ratio is 0.61 implying that, in the model, the native individuals at the top decile earns 61%
more than the median. The same ratio in the data is 57%, so although the model predicts
a higher upper tail income inequality than the one observed in the data, the di¤erence is
not signicant. The 1981 data value of the di¤erence between the log hourly wages of the
median and the 10th percentile of the income distribution shows that the median individual
earns 75% more than the individual in the rst decile. The model predicts this ratio as
66% which explains 90% of the income inequality observed at the lower tail. In addition to
these overall income inequality measures, college premium, which is the ratio of the average
wage earnings of college graduates to less than college graduates is compared with its data
counterpart. The model generates a college premium of 2.44 overpredicting its data value
of 1.41.
Figure 2 shows the histogram of the ability distribution of natives. The ability distrib-
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Variable Model Data
Wage bill ratio (natives) 23.00% 23.30%
Consumption output ratio 43.40% 52.80%
log(P50/P10) 0.66 0.75
log(P90/P50) 0.61 0.57
College premium (natives) 2.44 1.41
Capital output ratio 1.75 1.40
Table 17: Macro aggregates for the 1981 benchmark economy
ution is right skewed with a bulk of the ability levels being less than the mean ability level.
The average ability levels of college-graduate and less than college-graduate immigrants are
2.002 and 0.87 as reported in table 16. This implies that the average ability level of im-
migrants with education below college is less than that of the average ability of the native
population. The ability of college graduate immigrants is higher than the threshold ability
level for college enrollment among natives. This means with immigration, individuals who
can provide more human capital than some of the existing native workers are ow into the
country.
3.6 COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, I present the results of some counterfactual experiments. These experiments
aim to shed light on the long run impacts of exogenous changes in the foreign born labor
force which took place between 1981 and 2008 in Canada.
Table 12 in the data section reports the increase in the immigrant population and the
shift in their composition towards college graduates. Another change observed in the country
between 1981 and 2008 is the fast decline in the price of machinery and equipment type of
capital. Figure 3 illustrates the price of machinery and equipment relative to consumer non-
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Figure 2: Histogram of ability distribution of natives. a*=1.67 is the threshold ability level
for a college enrollment at the initial state. The mean of the ability distribution is normalized
to 1.
durables in Canada. Between 1981 and 2008, the relative price of machinery and equipment
fell by almost 50%. Based on Greenwood et al. (1997)[34], a decline in the relative price of
machinery and equipment is identical to the case where the relative price of each vintage of
capital is constant but its productivity is increasing over time. In a production environment
where machinery and equipment is complementary to more educated or skilled labor, the
period between 1981 and 2008 represents a period of increasing productivity for skilled labor.
Taken in a simple supply and demand framework, the stylized facts presented in table 12
and gure 3 suggest that the skilled labor market in Canada in the 1981-2008 period experi-
enced a positive supply shock due to increasing inows of college-educated immigrants and a
positive demand shock stemming from declining relative price of machinery and equipment.
The rst step of the counterfactual analysis is an assessment of the models performance
in explaining the economy in 2008. As mentioned above, I take into account three exogenous
changes that took place between 1981 and 2008. These are the relative share of immigrants
in the economy, the skill composition of the immigrants and the relative price of machinery
and equipment. Panel A in table 18 compares the 1981 and 2008 values for these variables.
In Panel B of table 18, I report the values for some key variables of the model and their
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Figure 3: Price of machinery and equipment relative to consumer nondurables.The relative
price in 1980 is normalized to 1. Source: Authors calculation.
data counterparts for the 2008 Canadian economy. From the beginning of the 1980s until
the end of the 2000s, the college attainment rate increased among native Canadians. In
1981, the share of college graduates was 8.6%, which later soared to 24.4% in 2008. The
model generates a similar increase in the college education attainment among natives. The
predicted ratio of college graduates to non-college graduates for the 2008 economy is 25% in
the model, which is very close to the 24.4% observed in the data. The model also explains
an important portion of the increase in the wage inequality between the two main education
groups. As reported in table 13, the increase in the ratio of average wage earnings of
college educated to less than college educated natives is 8%. The model-predicted value for
the percentage change in the college premium among natives is around 5.4%. With this
prediction the model explains almost 70% of the increase earnings inequality between college
graduates and those with less than college education. Overall, the model performs well in
explaining the simultaneous increase in college premium and college attainment rate among
natives between 1981 and 2008. The income share of capital displays a signicant rise in the
model from 38% to 52%. A similar upward movement is also observed in the data however
44
the magnitude is smaller - 2-3% points - in the data. The model captures the direction of
the change in the wage bill ratio between college graduate and less than college-educated
natives with some over prediction of its magnitude.
The overall income inequality measures used in this analysis are the log income di¤er-
ence between the top and bottom decile (log (P90/P10)), the top decile and median (log
(P90/P50)) and the median and the bottom decile (log (P50/P10)). A comparison of the
levels of the income inequality implied by the model and the 2008 data shows that the model
captures an important portion of the inequality at the bottom end of the income distribution
in 2008. The gap between the income of the median and the bottom decile is measured
as 68% in the data, and the model predicts a 67% di¤erence between median and bottom
decile earnings. The values for the log (P90/P50) and log (P90/10) are higher than their
data counterparts, meaning that the model generates a higher overall and upper tail income
inequality. However the di¤erence between the models predictions and the data values are
not pronounced.
How much did immigration contribute to the changes in the earnings and college at-
tainment of native Canadians observed between 1981 and 2008? To answer this question,
I simulate counterfactual 2008 economies, where I shut down the changes observed in the
immigrant population. Recall that these changes are an increase in its share among the total
population and a shift in its composition towards more college-graduate immigrants. Based
on these observations, the rst counterfactual experiment investigates how the increase in the
relative share of college-educated immigrants among the total immigrant population a¤ected
the Canadian economy. The second experiment compares the counterfactual economy in
which the immigrants maintain their 1981 share among the total population in the 2008
economy. The results of the counterfactual exercises are presented in table 19 and a discus-
sion of the results is provided in the following subsections. The rst subsection evaluates
the impacts of immigration on the relative earnings of college graduates and the college de-
cision of natives as well as the overall income inequality among the native population. The
following subsection analyzes how the welfare of the native population changed due to an
increase in the relative share of immigrants and their education level. In the last subsection
I evaluate the same counterfactual scenarios in an environment where interest rates are xed
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at the benchmark 2008 economy level.
Panel A: Exogenous changes between 1981-2008
1981 2008
Relative share of immigrants 20% 30%
Relative share of CG immigrants 12% 30%
Relative price of capital (1=q) 1 0.58
Panel B: 2008 economy Model vs. Data
2008 economy
Variable Model Data
CG native/total native 25.00% 24.40%
4 College premium 5.40% 8.00%
log(P90/P10) 1.55 1.43
log(P50/P10) 0.67 0.68
log(P90/P50) 0.87 0.75
Income share of capital 52.00% 40.00%
Wage bill ratio (natives) 80.00% 65.00%
Table 18: Canadian economy in 1981 and 2008
3.6.1 College Education Decision and College Premium
The wage ratio of college-educated labor to less than college-educated labor provides a guide-
line to understand how immigration can a¤ect the college decisions of natives and the college
premium. Using the rst order conditions derived from the rms prot maximization de-
cision, I get the following wage ratio;
wc
wh
=
(1  ) (1  )

f(qK) + (1  )(S)g   (S)
 1
(U) 1
(3.24)
This wage ratio measures "the relative price of skill" in the economy. In other words, it is
the wage earnings of a skilled worker relative to an unskilled one per e¢ ciency units of labor
he provides. The formula for the college premium among natives, which is comparable to
the one observed in the data, depends on the relative price of skill as well as the ratio of the
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average ability of college graduates and less than college graduates. Therefore the college
premium is given by;
College premium =
wc:
R
a
1
af(a) 1
1 F (a)da
wh:
R
0
a
af(a) 1
F (a)da
Krusell et al. (2000) compute the growth rate of the ratio of the wages for two types of labor
as follows;
g wc
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Here gx denotes the growth rate of the variable x. The equation decomposes the change
in relative price of skill into two parts. Using Krusell et al. (2000)[50] terminology the rst
e¤ect is the relative quantity e¤ect, which refers to the change in the share of skilled labor
relative to unskilled labor. The second e¤ect is the capital skill complementarity e¤ect,
which is mainly driven by the change in the e¢ ciency units of capital per skilled labor.
The rst counterfactual exercise investigates the impacts of a shift in the composition
of the foreign born labor force towards college-graduate individuals between 1981 and 2008.
The question I answer with this counterfactual exercise is as follows: If immigrants are
still 30% of the total population in 2008, but the relative share of college graduates among
the immigrant population remains at its 1981 value of 12%, what are the implications of
this for the Canadian economy? Under this scenario, labor markets are loaded with more
immigrants that are less than college-educated compared to the benchmark economy in 2008.
The increase in the share of workers below college education results in a decline in their wages.
In other words, the relative quantity e¤ect works in the direction of increasing the relative
price of skill. An increase in the share of unskilled immigrants also has implications for
the physical capital stock for the economy. Immigrants with less than college education
save less than their college-educated counterparts as illustrated in gure 15. This leads to
a smaller physical capital stock in the economy which acts as a drag on the wage ratio. So
the relative quantity and capital skill complementarity e¤ects work in opposite directions
on the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labor. How does college attainment among
natives respond to these changes? Under this counterfactual scenario, the share of native
individuals who continue with a college education are 7% points higher. This implies, if the
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composition of immigrants in Canada did not shift towards college graduates, 7 more natives
out of every 100 would be willing to get a college education. However, the natives who opt
for college education in the counterfactual economy have lower ability levels. Compared
to the benchmark economy in 2008, the college-graduate labor force is composed of more
natives with a lower average ability level. The resulting impact on the human capital
provided by college graduates relative to non-college graduates is a decline. As a result of
the relative scarcity of skilled labor, the relative skill price displays an increase from 1.22
to 1.24. One interesting result to point out is the decline in the average college premium
among natives. In the counterfactual 2008 economy with less college-educated immigrants,
the college premium increases by 4.9%. This is a 0.5% points less increase in the growth rate
of the average college premium compared to the benchmark case. The main reason for the
slower rise in the average earnings premium enjoyed by college graduates is the lower average
ability level among college graduates. Although college-educated workers earn more per unit
of human capital, their average earnings relative to high-school graduates is smaller under
the counterfactual economy due to the decline in the average human capital they provide.
In the second exercise, I analyze the e¤ects of having a higher share of immigrant pop-
ulation on native Canadians in 2008. To achieve this, I construct a counterfactual 2008
economy in which the relative share of immigrants is at its 1981 level. The results of this
experiment are presented in column 5 of table 19. An immediate impact of having fewer
immigrants in the economy is a decline in the labor supply by two education groups. This
leads to an increase in the wage earnings of both college graduates and those with less than
a college education. The model also predicts the per capita physical capital in the counter-
factual economy with a smaller immigrant population to be higher. The main reason for
the surge in the per capita capital is the decline in the population with less immigrants.
The wage earnings of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor is slightly lower in the
economy with a smaller immigrant population. Recall that this wage ratio depends on the
relative quantity e¤ect and capital-skill complementarity e¤ect. Under this scenario, the
increase in capital per skilled labor pulls up the relative skill price. On the other hand,
the relative quantity e¤ect works in the opposite direction. In the counterfactual economy
with fewer immigrants, the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor is higher. This is due
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to more natives opting for a college education. A higher ratio of skilled labor to unskilled
labor drags the relative skill price and o¤sets the capital-skill complementarity e¤ect. The
nal resulting change in the wage ratio is a 1% decline.
Despite the fact that the relative skill price is slightly less, the interest rates are lower
under the counterfactual economy. Interest rates decline as an outcome of the increase in
the per capita physical capital. This makes the loans borrowed to cover tuition expenses
more a¤ordable for natives, and hence increases the net value of college education. The
resulting change in the college decisions of natives is an increase by 3 % points compared
to the benchmark 2008 economy. In other words, with fewer immigrants in the economy,
3 more natives out of 100 are willing to get a college education. The average college
premium among natives also exhibits a slower growth rate under the economy with a smaller
immigrant population. This stems from the lower relative skill price and the average ability
of college-graduate natives compared to the benchmark economy.
An evaluation of the impacts of all changes observed in the immigrant population be-
tween 1981 and 2008 on the Canadian economy is reported in the last column of table 19.
This counterfactual scenario illustrates the case in which the immigrant population does
not change between 1981 and 2008. In accordance with the previous two counterfactual
experiments, college attainment among natives is 7% points higher compared to the bench-
mark economy. This increase in college attainment is an outcome of the higher net value
of being a college graduate as mentioned above. Comparing the relative wage earnings of
skilled labor with the benchmark 2008 economy shows that the relative skill price is slightly
lower. Although there is no signicant change in the relative earnings per e¢ ciency units
of college-graduate labor, the average college premium enjoyed by natives exhibits a slower
growth under the counterfactual economy due to the composition e¤ects.
To sum up, the changes in the immigrant population observed between 1981 and 2008 in
Canada have important e¤ects on the college attainment of natives. The bulk of the decline
in the college attainment of natives is due to the shift in the composition of immigrants
towards college graduates. In other words, the selective immigration policy of Canada
discourages natives with lower ability levels from pursuing a college education and replaces
them with foreign born ones. The changes in the immigrant population also have impacts
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on the average wage earnings of skilled workers relative to the unskilled ones. Both the
increase in the share of immigrants and the shift in their composition increases the average
premium paid to college-graduate natives. The model predicts that the contribution of
immigration to the rise in college premium among natives between 1981 and 2008 is around
2.3% points. This is around 40% of the total increase predicted by the model.
The model provides an environment in which immigration can be evaluated in terms
of the impacts it has on the measures of overall income inequality. A comparison of the
benchmark economy in 2008 with the counterfactual economies shows that immigration has
no signicant impact on the overall income inequality as well as the income inequality at
the lower and upper tails. The increase in the overall income inequality (P90/P10) as well
as the upper tail (P90/P50) and lower tail (P50/P10) income inequality observed between
1981 and 2008 are due to improvements in technology which favor skilled labor. In their
discussion of the increase in overall and upper tail income inequality observed in the U.S.,
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) refer to compositional and price e¤ects. They argue that
changes in the composition of the labor force with an increase in individuals with higher
education or higher experience levels may result in increased income inequality. In their
words
"Changes in the distribution of education or experience can lead to changes in wage
dispersion. These compositional e¤ects are distinct from the standard price e¤ects arising
from shifts in supply-demand and institutional factors. Holding market prices constant,
changes in labor force composition can mechanically raise or lower residual earnings dis-
persion simply by altering the employment share of worker groups that have more or less
dispersed earnings. Similarly, changes in workforce composition can also raise or lower
overall earnings dispersion by increasing or reducing heterogeneity in observed skills."
Based on their argument, the increase in the overall and the upper tail income inequality
arises due to an increased heterogeneity in the composition of the labor force in an environ-
ment where advances in technology are favoring skilled labor.
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3.6.2 Welfare Comparisons
Changes in the immigrant population a¤ect all factor returns in the economy as presented
in the previous section. In order to understand the overall impact of changes in all fac-
tor returns on the natives, I quantify the welfare impacts of immigration. The welfare
comparisons are based on the Lucasmeasure which can be expressed as follows20;
JX
j=1
j 1u((1 + )co;j(a)) =
JX
j=1
j 1u(c1;j(a)) (3.26)
where co;j(a) and c1;j(a) represent the consumption of a native of age j, and ability level
a for the benchmark case in 2008 and the 2008 economy under counterfactual scenarios.
In this formulation  measures the percentage change in permanent consumption that the
individual experiences due to the changes in immigrant population. Table 20 reports the
values of  for the highest, median and lowest ability individuals in the economy.
I begin the analysis by examining the welfare impacts of the shift in the composition
of immigrants towards college graduates. I analyze this case by computing the percentage
change in permanent consumption under the scenario that the share of college graduates
among the foreign born does not change. In other words, this is the counterfactual 2008
economy in which immigrants are 30% of the total population but the relative share of
college graduates among immigrants is at its 1981 level of 12%. The results in panel A
show that all three types of natives experience a welfare loss under this scenario. This is
an outcome of higher tax rates on labor earnings and lower wages of both education groups
in the counterfactual economy. In this economy compared to the benchmark one there are
more immigrants with education level below college. This results in a drop in the wages of
median and low ability workers who opt out of college education. For the highest ability
individual there is also a decrease in the labor earnings resulting from the higher college
attainment rate among natives. The welfare loss of the highest ability individual amounts
to 0.016% drop in his permanent consumption. The lowest and median ability individuals
also su¤er a loss in welfare equivalent to a drop of 0.023% in their permanent consumption
20Lucas measures the welfare cost of business cycles by calculating the  which he denes to be the change
in the permanent consumption of individuals.
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levels.
Panel B reports the welfare e¤ects of an increase in the relative share of the immigrant
population. In the counterfactual 2008 economy where the relative share of immigrants is
the same as its 1981 value, highest, lowest and median ability natives enjoy a 0.07% increase
in permanent consumption. This result implies that an increase in the relative size of the
immigrant population creates a welfare loss for these natives. The main reason for this loss
is the decline in the wages of both skilled and unskilled labor. Although the interest rate
is 0.3% points higher in the benchmark 2008 economy, the increase in capital income is not
enough to compensate for the decline in labor earnings. Also a comparison of the tax rates
shows that, the tax rate on labor income is higher under the benchmark 2008 economy than
the counterfactual economy. This is another factor which contributes to the welfare loss
accruing to natives due to the increase in the relative size of immigrants.
Finally I examine how the increase in the size of the immigrant population along with a
shift in its composition towards college graduates change the welfare of natives. The results
of this analysis are presented in panel C of the table. Under the counterfactual economy
where the immigrant population is the same as in 1981, all three types of native enjoy a
0.06% points increase in their permanent consumption. Based on this result, I infer that
the overall changes of the immigrant population created a loss for natives in Canada between
1981 and 2008. As mentioned above, these losses are an outcome of the decline in wages
due to immigration and higher labor income tax rates. The results of the counterfactual
experiments in panels A and B show that the welfare loss of natives resulting from changes
in the immigrant population is mainly due to the increase in its size. On the other hand,
admitting more college-graduate immigrants to the country benets natives at the upper
and lower ends of the ability distribution as well as the median individual.
Borjas (1994)[11] is one of the rst studies which examines the welfare impacts of immi-
gration. He calculates the increase in the income accruing to natives due to immigration,
i.e., an "immigration surplus". In his partial equilibrium setting, an immigration surplus
occurs because, although there is a reduction in the wages of natives, the rise in interest rates
results in an increase in capital income. This soar in capital income more than compensates
for the reduction in the labor earnings of natives which in the end creates net positive gain
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of immigration to the native population. He reports the increase in the income accruing to
the native population due to a 10% increase in the labor force due to immigration to be on
the order of 0.1 % of GDP, assuming that labor and capital are not perfectly substitutable.
However, the immigration surplus becomes even smaller with endogenous physical capital.21
Individuals adjust their saving decisions in response to an immediate rise in the interest
rates which increases the physical capital stock in the economy. This in turn drives down
the increase in capital income accruing to the native population. The results in table 19
show that in the benchmark 2008 economy, the interest rates are higher compared to the
counterfactual economy with no changes in the immigrant population. However the decline
in the wages for both education groups combined with higher labor income taxes outdoes
the increase in interest rates. This creates the decrease in the permanent consumption of
all three ability levels in my model.
How do the welfare impacts of immigration compare to the other general equilibrium
models which take the human capital of natives as exogenous? An important result presented
in table 19 is that the selective immigration policy of Canada, which encourages college
graduates, results in a reduction in the share of college graduate natives. As discussed
above, all three ability types of natives experience a nearly 0.02% decrease in their permanent
consumption if the skill composition of immigrant population does not change. The reason
for median and low ability individuals to su¤er a decline in their permanent consumption is
that in this economy there are more immigrants with an education below the college level in
the country which results in a reduction in unskilled wages compared to the benchmark 2008
economy. For the college graduates, the decrease in permanent consumption is an outcome
of the endogenous college education decision. Despite the fact that there is a smaller share
of college graduate immigrants in the economy compared to the benchmark case, the higher
college attainment rate among natives prevents a possible increase of college graduate wages
in the economy. That is the main reason for not observing a higher increase in the welfare
of the highest ability individual under the 2008 economy where the skill composition of the
immigrant population is the same as in 1981.
Ben-Gad (2008)[8] runs a similar experiment for the U.S. economy whose results can be
21Ben-Gad (2004,2008) point to this fact.
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compared qualitatively to the counterfactual scenario in panel A. He analyzes the percentage
change in permanent consumption for skilled and unskilled households due to an increase in
the unskilled immigration rate. In that case, skilled households enjoy an increase in their
welfare whereas unskilled households face a drop in their permanent consumption levels.
The reason for the increase in the permanent consumption of skilled households in his model
is that with more unskilled immigrants in the economy, the skilled labor force becomes
less scarce. This increases their wage earnings hence their welfare. In other words, in
the absence of an endogenous human capital channel, the native populations response of
increasing their educational attainment to spur an increase in skilled wages is not taken into
account. This makes a surge in unskilled immigration benecial for skilled households. A
similar increase in the welfare of the highest ability individual is not observed in the current
model because the higher college attainment among natives drives down their wages, hence
their welfare.
% change in the permanent consumption of natives
A. No change in college graduate share among immigrants
Highest ability -0.016
Median ability -0.023
Lowest ability -0.023
B. No change in the relative size of immigrants
Highest ability 0.071
Median ability 0.074
Lowest ability 0.074
C. No change in immigrant population
Highest ability 0.059
Median ability 0.058
Lowest ability 0.058
Table 20: Welfare analysis of immigration
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3.6.3 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
In the general equilibrium setting the factor returns, i.e. wage and interest rates are deter-
mined endogenously in equilibrium. They adjust to changes in the individuals human and
physical capital accumulation choices. In this section, I analyze how the changes in the
immigrant population would a¤ect the Canadian economy if the interest rates were xed at
a certain level.
A xed interest rate in the economy changes the total physical capital stock by a¤ecting
the savings choice of individuals. The impact of the change in the physical capital stock is
realized through two channels. The rst is the wage earnings channel. Physical capital is
an input to the production process together with the skilled and unskilled labor. A higher
level of capital results in higher productivity, therefore higher wages, for both types of labor.
In a production setting where physical capital is more complementary to skilled labor the
wages of skilled workers respond more to the changes in the physical capital stock.
Changes in the physical capital stock in the economy also have implications for the
equilibrium tax rate in the model economy. Both taxable labor and capital income depend
on the physical capital stock. An increase in the physical capital stock results in higher
wages, therefore a higher labor income. On the other hand, the capital income also increases
in response to a higher level of physical capital in the economy. The direction and magnitude
of the change in equilibrium tax rate depends on the interaction between labor and capital
income in this case.
Nativescollege education choices are naturally a¤ected from all these changes in wages
and equilibrium labor income tax rate. A native individual decides whether or not to get
college education by comparing the benets and costs of college education. In other words,
the share of college-educated individuals among the native population depends on;
i) The wage di¤erence between college graduates and high school graduates less of taxes
ii) The opportunity cost of college education which corresponds to the foregone wage
earnings less of taxes during college education years
iii) The direct cost of schooling in other words the total amount of tuition loans individ-
uals get to nance their college education
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As the di¤erential between the wages earned by a college-educated and high school-
educated individual per e¢ ciency unit of labor provided widens, the incentive to enroll in
college increases. On the other hand, a higher level of wages earned by high school graduates
has an opposite impact on the college education incentives of natives because it implies a
larger opportunity cost of college education. An increase in labor income tax has two
opposing e¤ects. Firstly higher tax on labor income will decrease the net level of earnings
gap between college graduates and high school graduates, ceteris paribus. In addition, by
decreasing the net income gained by unskilled workers, it will result in a lower opportunity
cost of schooling. Changes in interest rates also a¤ect the individuals college education
choice by increasing or decreasing the burden of the loans individuals borrow to nance
their education.
Table 21 reports the results of the counterfactual experiments in a partial equilibrium
setting where the interest rates are kept constant at the 2008 benchmark economy levels.
The partial equilibrium results give an idea about the small open economy version of the
model where the country takes the interest rate as given.
When the interest rates are xed at 6.36% a smaller share of natives go to college in
the counterfactual economy with no change in the skill composition of immigrants. In the
partial equilibrium model the interest rates and wage earnings of high school graduates are
lower resulting in a lower direct and opportunity cost of college education. These channels
work in the same direction and increase the incentives to get college education. Compared
to the general equilibrium case, the wage gap between college and high school graduates and
labor income tax rates are higher in the partial equilibrium model. An individual benets
from more premium by opting for college education in an economy with lower interest rates,
however the higher income taxes drag down the di¤erential wage earnings. The reason
for observing a slightly lower ratio of college graduates among natives is the higher labor
income taxes which reduce the motivation to get college education in comparison to the
general equilibrium setting where taxes on labor income are lower.
Column 5 in table 21 presents the results for the counterfactual 2008 economy with no
change in the relative size of immigrants. The college graduates make up a 1% higher share
of the total native population. In this economy the interest rates are 0.26% points more
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compared to the general equilibrium case. Facing higher xed interest rates individuals save
more which increases the total physical capital stock in the economy. The larger stock of
physical capital boosts the productivity hence the wages of both skilled and unskilled labor.
Skilled workers benet more from the accumulation of capital in the economy since physical
capital is more complementary to the labor services provided by the college-educated. The
bigger increase in skilled wages leads to a higher premium for college education thereby
motivating more natives to enroll in college compared to the general equilibrium case. On
the other hand higher interest rates and unskilled wages pull up the cost of college education
which work in the opposite direction and diminish the net benet from enrolling in college.
The observed increase in the share of college-educated natives shows that the increase in
college premium e¤ect dominates the higher cost of college education therefore more natives
opt for college education.
In the counterfactual economy with no change in the immigrant population and xed
interest rates, the relative share of natives who go to college are 18% points higher than
the same economy with variable interest rates. With xed and higher interest rates the
premium from getting college education is more and the labor income tax rates are lower.
These two changes together generate a greater net gain of enrolling in college than the
general equilibrium case with variable interest rates. Meanwhile both the direct and the
opportunity cost of college education in terms of foregone wage earnings are higher in the
partial equilibrium model. The observed increase in the relative share of college-educated
natives implies that the rise in the net earnings gain from college education more than o¤sets
the negative impacts of higher costs of college education on the college education incentives
of individuals.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
The immigrant population in Canada went through remarkable changes between 1981 and
2008. In addition to the signicant increase in their relative share among the total popula-
tion, the countrys selective immigration policy attracted many highly educated workers to
the country. This paper evaluates how the changes in immigrant population between 1981
and 2008 a¤ected native Canadians. In particular, I quantify the impacts of immigration
on the college attainment and the welfare of natives as well as the wage inequality between
college graduates and non-college graduates. My ndings suggest that the immigration
experience of Canada resulted in lower college attainment rates among natives between 1981
and 2008. The results from counterfactual experiments show that the share of college grad-
uates among natives decreases by 7% points due to changes in the immigrant population.
The counterfactual experiments which isolate the impact of the increase in the relative share
of immigrants and the shift in their composition reveal that the main factor which discour-
ages natives from college education is the increase in the relative share of college graduates
among immigrants.
A larger immigrant population with more college graduates increases the college premium
among natives slightly. The main reason for the increase in the college premium is that
higher ability natives are selected into college education in response to having more and
higher educated immigrants. This results in an increase in the average ability of college-
graduate natives relative to those with education below college, hence increasing the average
wage earnings ratio between to college and high school graduates.
The welfare analysis shows that natives at both ends as well as the middle of the ability
distribution enjoy higher welfare in the economy where college graduates are a higher pro-
portion of the immigrant labor force. This result is interesting because it suggests that even
the highest ability native who is a college graduate benets from the selective immigration
policy of the country. The main reason for the increase in welfare is the increase in the
labor earnings of both education groups as well as the lower tax rate in the economy. On
the other hand, the increase in the relative size of immigrants decreases the permanent con-
sumption of natives of all ability levels by nearly 0.1%. Unlike the shift in the composition
60
of immigrants towards college graduates, the increase in the relative share of the immi-
grant population results in lower wages and higher labor income tax rate for both education
groups. The combined impact of lower wages and higher labor income taxes is a decrease
in permanent consumption which decreases the welfare of natives. Overall, the results of
the welfare analysis suggest that the selective immigration policy of Canada benets both
college-graduate and less than college-graduate natives who are at the lower and upper ends
as well as the middle of the ability distribution. On the other hand, an increase in the size
of the immigrant population creates a welfare loss for these natives.
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4.0 UNDOCUMENTED WORKERSEMPLOYMENT OVER THE U.S.
BUSINESS CYCLES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to analyze the di¤erences in the variation of undocumented
and documented workersemployment during the business cycles in the U.S. between 1990
and 2008. The changes in the adjustment of employment of undocumented worker during
economic booms and recessions could have important policy implications. The employment
of undocumented workers might be seen as a bu¤er in the labor market. In other words,
undocumented workers might represent a cushion or latent group of workers which provide
employers hiring and ring exibility across variations in product demand. If this is the case,
immigration reform that restricts the number, or a¤ects the status, of undocumented workers
might also curtail the exibility in labor markets that employers currently have, increasing
their hiring costs along with the likelihood of an increase in consumer prices. The degree to
which di¤erences in employment variability between documented and undocumented workers
can be quantied will provide a better understanding of the impact on employers of restricting
access to a source of exible labor might be.
According to our review, there are no studies on undocumented immigration employment
over the business cycles. However, if we consider that more than 62% of undocumented
workers come from Mexico and 47% of unauthorized workers between 25-64 years old have
less than high school education, we can draw some suggestions from specic studies on the
adjustment of low-skilled and immigrant workers relative to higher-skilled and native workers
over economic uctuations.
Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008)[23] study the cyclical behavior of hours worked by skilled
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labor in the U.S. between 1979 and 2003. They document that skilled hours have become
more volatile since 1984. Using a production function with complementarity between capital
and skilled labor they show that they can explain 60% of the increase in the volatility of
skilled hours.
Hoynes (2000)[45] examines the relative impact of economic cycles on the employment,
earnings, and income of individuals across di¤erent skill groups. Her ndings show that the
labor market outcomes of less-skilled workers exhibit more variability over business cycles
than those of higher-skilled groups. She also concludes that non-whites and those with lower
education levels are more impacted by changes in economic conditions.
Using Census data, Orrenius and Zavodny (2010)[62] analyze the impact of recessions on
Mexican immigrants. Their results indicate that low-educated Mexican immigrantsemploy-
ment and unemployment are more responsive to business cycle uctuations than are Hispanic
and white non-Hispanic US natives. In addition Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel (2010)[30] study
the di¤erences in the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of immigrants and natives
for Germany and United Kingdom. They nd signicantly larger responses to economic
shocks for immigrants relative to natives within the same skill group, and for low-skilled
workers relative to high-skilled workers. Further evidence of the dramatic cyclical variabil-
ity of employment among immigrants is found in Mandelman and Zlate (2010)[56]. They
track a great deal of cyclical variability in remittances originating in the U.S. Variations in
employment outcomes will necessarily impact the availability of funds to send home.
From these previous studies, it might be expected that undocumented workers are more
exposed to business cycle uctuations than documented workers. Due to their lower skill
levels, including the high probability of not being able to speak English well, employers
are likely to rst dismiss undocumented workers during an economic downturn, as they
attempt to preserve productivity levels while cutting costs. In addition, employers informally
hiring undocumented workers would likely face lower xed costs of hiring and dismissing
undocumented workers. Further, employment of undocumented workers is concentrated in
certain industries and occupations that might be more sensitive to economic uctuations.
On the other hand, there could be countervailing factors a¤ecting cyclical variation in
undocumented workersemployment. For example, Pena (2010)[67] shows evidence that
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undocumented workers are typically paid lower wages than similarly skilled documented
workers. Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2010)[44] explain the wage di¤erential by di¤erences
in productivity. Brown, Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2008)[16] nd that rms who hire
undocumented workers enjoy a competitive advantage. These factors would perhaps result
in undocumented workers being the last to be dismissed during an economic downturn, as
dismissing documented workers would reduce costs by a greater amount. In addition, Borjas
(2001)[12] points out that undocumented workers like immigrants in general, are typically
more mobile geographically and across industries and occupations than native workers. This
suggests that undocumented worker employment may not su¤er as greatly as documented
workers employment during economic downturns, as undocumented workers are more exible
in chasing the remaining jobs. Orrenius and Zavodny (2010)[62] draw attention to previous
researchs ndings that immigrantsvulnerabilities tend to outweigh these positive factors.
Based on this they conclude that immigrantsemployment and earnings of immigrants are
more sensitive to business cycle uctuations than that of natives.
Undocumented workers employment could appear to be more sensitive to business
cycle uctuations if undocumented workers experience higher levels of separation overall.
Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2010)[44] nd that during the expansionary period of 1997-
2000, the average quarterly separation rate for documented workers was 18.4% and for undoc-
umented workers 40%. On average, undocumented workers are likely to have been on their
current job a shorter amount of time, have less labor market experience, and reect greater
separation behavior (not holding anything else constant). In addition, Morales (1983)[58]
provides evidence that undocumented workers appear to be concentrated among smaller em-
ployers who experience a greater degree of churning among its workforce, suggesting a need
for workforce exibility in its production process.
In our study, we examine the employment of undocumented and documented workers
at business cycle frequency looking at quarterly data for the state of Georgia between 1990
and 2008. The analysis of the business cycle properties of the undocumented employment
reveals that undocumented workers employment is more volatile during business cycles
compared to documented ones. Another observation is that the volatility of documented
employment remains constant throughout the whole period whereas a decline in the volatility
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of undocumented employment is observable after 1999. For the purposes of this study we
focus on the higher volatility of the undocumented employment and provide an explanation
for this data fact.
Our hypothesis for explaining larger adjustments in employment outcomes among undoc-
umented workers than documented workers across the business cycle is the higher elasticity
of substitution of undocumented labor with physical capital compared to documented la-
bor. This explanation is inspired by numerous other studies that examine the elasticity of
substitution between capital and di¤erent types of labor. In these studies, focus is mostly
on di¤erent education groups of workers. Griliches (1969)[35] was the rst to document
the complementarity between skilled labor and physical capital. Berndt and Christensen
(1974)[10], Fallon and Layard (1975)[32], Denny and Fuss (1977)[27], Brown and Christensen
(1981)[17] also report evidence that the unskilled labor is more substitutable with capital
than skilled labor. A more recent study by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante
(2000)[50] (hereafter KORV (2000)) estimate the elasticity of substitution between unskilled
labor, skilled labor and capital equipment. They use a CES production technology with two
types of capital and nd that skilled labor is complementary to capital. Their estimate for
the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital suggests a higher degree of
substitutability between these two factors than the Cobb-Douglas case.
Based on the above mentioned empirical evidence, our strategy is to replace undoc-
umented labor with the unskilled and documented labor with skilled and use the same
production technology as in KORV (2000)[50] with one type of capital. The intuition for
the link between the volatility of undocumented labor and its elasticity of substitution with
capital is as follows: If capital is xed in the short-run and undocumented workers are more
substitutable with capital than documented workers, rms will make short-run adjustments
to production levels in response to economic variation in product demand by adjusting em-
ployment levels of undocumented workers. This will make the employment of this group
more volatile compared to the documented ones.
The results from our quantitative analysis suggest that with a production technology
where undocumented workers are more substitutable with capital than documented labor,
we can explain the higher sensitivity of undocumented employment to business cycles. The
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model does particularly well in matching the volatility of the undocumented employment
for the 2000-2008 period explaining almost 80% of the variation of the employment of this
group at business cycle frequency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the data and section 4.3 presents
the stylized data facts. In section 4.4, we explain our theoretical framework and our quan-
titative analysis, nally section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 DATA
The primary data used for the analyses in this paper are the Employer File and the Individual
Wage File compiled by the Georgia Department of Labor for the purposes of administering
the states Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. These data are highly condential and
strictly limited in their distribution. The data are available from the rst quarter of 1990
through the fourth quarter of 2008. The Employer File provides an almost complete census
of rms, covering approximately 99.7% of all wage and salary workers.1 The establishment-
level information includes the number of employees, the total wage bill, and the NAICS
classication of each establishment. The Individual Wage File links individual workers to
their employer. The data also contain a 6-digit NAICS industry code and the county of
location, allowing us to construct or merge in industry and county level indicators, such as
county unemployment rate.2
4.2.1 Identifying Invalid Social Security Numbers
Every quarter employers must le a report with their states Department of Labor detailing
all wages paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935.3 Each
worker on this report is identied by his/her social security number (SSN). There are a
number of ways in which one can establish that a reported social security number is invalid.
The Social Security Administration provides a service by which an employer can upload
1Source: Committee on Ways and Means (2004)
2Regrettably, the data set contains no information about workersdemographics or immigration status.
3For information about which workers are covered, see U.S. Department of Labor (2008).
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a le of SSNs for checking, but one must register as an employer to obtain this service.4
In addition, there are several known limitations on what can be considered a valid social
security number, so a simple algorithm is used to check whether each number conforms to
the valid parameters.
There are three pieces to a SSN.5 The rst three numbers are referred to as the area
number. This number is assigned based on the state in which the application for a SSN
was made; it does not necessarily reect the state of residence. The lowest area number
possible is 001 and the highest area number ever issued as of December 2008 is 772. Using
information provided by the SSA, the dates at which area numbers between 691 and 772 are
rst assigned can be determined. Any SSN with an area number equal to 000, greater than
772 or which shows up before the o¢ cially assigned date will be considered invalid. The last
four digits of a SSN are referred to as the serial number. These are assigned consecutively
from 0001 to 9999. Any SSN with a serial number equal to 0000 is invalid.
In 1996 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the Individual Tax Identication
Number (ITIN) to allow individuals who had income from the U.S. to le a tax return. It
is simply a tax processing number and does not authorize an individual to work in the U.S.
Employers are instructed by the IRS to not accept an ITIN in place of a SSN for employee
identication for work. An ITIN is only available to resident and nonresident aliens who
are not eligible for U.S. employment and need identication for other tax purposes.6 ITIN
numbers have a "9" in the rst digit of the area number and a "7" or "8" in the rst digit
of the group number. Anyone with this numbering scheme will be identied as having an
invalid area number. The percent of SSNs with high area numbers that also match the ITIN
numbering scheme has risen from about one percent in 1997 to over 60% by the end of 2006.
A series of SSNs were de-commissioned by the Social Security Administration because
they had been put on fake Social Security Cards used as props to sell wallets.7 Apparently,
some people who purchased the wallets thought the fake Social Security Cards were real and
4See Social Security Number Verication Service <http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnv.htm>.
5Historical information and information about valid SSNs can be found at the Social Security Adminis-
trations web sites: <http://www.ssa.gov>, <http://www.socialsecurity.gov>
6"Hiring Employees" <http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0id=98164,00.html> Also see "In-
dividual Taxpayer Identication Number" <http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0id=96287,00.html>.
7See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1990).
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started using them as their own. If any of these 21 "pocketbook" SSNs appear in the data,
they are considered invalid although their frequency is so low as to be inconsequential. In
addition, a number of SSNs are exactly equal to the employer identication number. These
are invalid, primarily because they have too few digits. In any instance where a SSN is used
for more than one person on a rms UI wage report or does not have the required number
of digits (including zeros), the SSN is considered invalid.
The possibility that someone fraudulently uses a valid SSN assigned to someone else
poses a special problem. First of all, the SSN will show up multiple times across rms
in one quarter for workers with di¤erent surnames. With this information alone, it is not
possible to know which worker is using the SSN fraudulently and who the valid owner of the
number is. If one of the SSN/surname pairs shows up in the data initially in a quarter by
itself, this is the pair that is considered valid and all other duplicates with di¤erent surnames
are considered invalid.
Examining the patterns of incidence of di¤erent types of invalid SSNs suggests that some
types are rm generated rather than worker generated. Figure 4 illustrates the incidence
patterns across types of invalid SSNs in construction. The percent of workers with SSNs
having a high area number or out-of-sequence group number displays the growth in undocu-
mented workers whereas the incidence of SSNs for other reasons exhibits a at to declining,
highly seasonal pattern.8 The strong seasonal nature of the other invalid reasons suggests
that rms are temporarily assigning invalid SSN numbers to workers before having time to
gather the information for the purpose of record keeping/reporting. Or, rms may decide to
not bother obtaining a SSN for workers who will only be employed a very short time.9
Figure 5 plots the prevalence of undocumented workers in the seven broadly dened
sectors with the highest incidences. The concentration of workers in these sectors was also
identied nationally by Capps, Fortuny and Passel (2007)[20]. The pattern of growth is also
consistent with their estimate that 72 % of unauthorized immigrants in Georgia arrived in
the last 10 years.
Capps et al. (2007)[20] estimate that 4.5% of the workforce in Georgia was undocumented
8See Baker, Hoefer and Rytina (2010) for an analysis of the undocumented population in the U.S.
9Indeed, a worker has 90 days to resolve a discrepancy that results in the receipt of a "no-match" letter
from the Social Security Administration. The employee may be long gone before such a letter is even received.
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Figure 4: Percent of workers with invalid SSN, by reason, 1990:1-2008:4
1990:1 1992:1 1994:1 1996:1 1998:1 2000:1 2002:1 2004:1 2006:1 2008:1
0
0.02
0.04
0
0.05
0.1
Construction
Manufacturing
Retail Trade
Professional and Business Services
Leisure and Hospitality
Other Services
Agriculture
Figure 5: Percent of undocumented workers by broad industry, 1990:1-2008:4. Agriculture
is measured on the right axis.
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in 2004. In our sample 1% of workers are classied as undocumented in 2004, implying that
the sample used for the analysis in this paper is capturing about 22% of all undocumented
workers in the state of Georgia. This is a respectable representation given that to be included
in the sample all workers have been included on the rms wage report in the rst place and
we are being very conservative in the identication of workers as undocumented. Note that
the identication process we use in this paper does not make any assumptions about whether
the employer knows a worker is documented or undocumented. In addition, the goal of the
conservative identication process was to end up with a sample in which we can have a high
degree of condence that the sample is representative of the undocumented workforce, not
to actually count the number of undocumented workers in Georgia.
4.2.2 Are Undocumented Workers Correctly Identied?
There are several reasons we are condent that the sample of undocumented workers is
representative. First of all, the rate of growth seen in both the number and percent of
undocumented workers identied in Georgia matches closely the rate of growth in the Social
Security Administrations (SSA) earnings suspense le (ESF). The ESF is a repository
of social security taxes paid by employers that cannot be matched to a valid name or SSN.
Bovbjerg (2006)[15] argues that growth in the ESF reects growing incidence of unauthorized
work in the U.S.
Figure 6 plots the number of workers (panel a) and the percent of workers (panel b)
identied as undocumented along with the size of the ESF. This gure shows a remarkable
consistency between the growth seen in workers identied as undocumented and the ESF.
Data suggest that between 40% and 60% of Mexicans in the U.S. are undocumented,
and that 61% of unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico. Clearly not all Hispanics
are undocumented, or vice versa, however using weighted data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS), we calculate the average annual growth in total workers and total number
of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. and in Georgia in order to compare growth
rates to those in our sample. These results are reported in Table 22. The work force in
GA grew faster over the period than the U.S. work force (2.8% vs. 1.4% respectively).
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Figure 6: Wages in earnings suspense les and the number and percent of undocumented
workers in Georgia, 1990-2006
In addition, the number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. grew faster (7% per
year) than the overall work force. This observation has been documented by Passel and Cohn
(2009b)[64]. More important for us is that the growth rate of foreign born, Hispanic workers
in GA (roughly 21% per year), which is much larger than in the U.S. overall is similar to the
growth in the number of workers in GA classied here as undocumented (roughly 29%).
The close match in growth rates in the number of workers classied as undocumented
with that of the SSA ESF and with the number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in Georgia
as measured by the CPS, suggests that the mechanism employed in this paper to identify
undocumented workers is accurate. It is clear that not all undocumented workers are being
captured in the data, but likely those identied as undocumented are undocumented.
4.3 STYLIZED FACTS
Quantifying di¤erences in the variation of employment of documented and undocumented
workers across the business cycle is accomplished in this section by analyzing a series of styl-
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Average annual growth rate
Total number of workers in the U.S. 1.43%
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. 7.26%
Total number of workers in Georgia 2.82%
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in Georgia 20.74%
Total number of workers in GA identied as undocumented 29.65%
Table 22: Average annual growth, 1994-2008 in US and GA employment, Hispanic workers
and workers identied as undocumented. Source: Current Population Survey, Basic Survey
(March) 1994-2006 and authorscalculation
ized facts. The analysis begins with Figure 7, which shows the log of the cyclical components
of employment for documented and undocumented workers along with Georgias gross state
product (GA GSP).10 It is immediately apparent from this gure that undocumented worker
employment is much more volatile than documented worker employment. Even slight eco-
nomic downturns, as was seen in 1997, is accompanied by dramatic swings in undocumented
worker employment. In addition, movements of documented worker employment appear to
follow movements of and GA GSP are very closely, whereas the peaks and troughs in the
undocumented worker series appear to lag those of GA GSP.
Table 23 conrms these observations. We report the standard deviation of the cyclical
component of logged employment series for undocumented and documented workers as a mea-
sure of the volatility. Over the entire period of analysis, volatility of undocumented worker
employment (0.07 log points) is more than three times higher than volatility of documented
worker employment (0.02 log points). In addition, while the volatility of documented worker
employment has remained constant over the entire period, volatility of undocumented worker
employment has dropped from 0.08 between 1990 and 1999 to 0.06 for the last eight years
of study (2000 to 2008). Rolling standard deviations for eight quarters shown in Figure 8
further illustrates these two observations; greater volatility of employment of undocumented
workers and a clear decline in that volatility over time.
10The series for Georgias Gross State Product is annual, instead we use the quarterly series for Georgias
Personal Income (subtracting transfers) as a proxy. See appendix C.
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Figure 7: Cyclical component of documented and undocumented employment and output in
Georgia, 1990:1-2008:4.
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Figure 8: Rolling standard deviations of the cyclical components of undocumented and
documented employment
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These patterns of volatility are fairly consistent across industry sectors; for every sector,
undocumented worker employment volatility exceeds that of documented workers by an
order of two (in Construction) to an order of ten (in Education and Health). However,
not all sectors experienced the same moderation in volatility among undocumented worker
employment from the 1990s to the 2000s. Volatility ranged from 2.3 times higher in the
1990s in Agriculture to volatility that actually increased from the 1990s to the 2000s (in
Retail Trade, Information, and Education and Health). In addition, among documented
workers, employment became signicantly less volatile between the two time periods in
Education and Health and in Other Services. Nonetheless, while not perfectly consistent,
the pattern of greater moderation in volatility of undocumented worker employment holds
across most sectors.
Grouping sectors based on two characteristics, skill and labor intensity, tells us more
about the nature of volatility levels and how they di¤er across undocumented and docu-
mented workers. As we would expect from the literature, low skilled documented employ-
ment has a higher volatility (0.026) than high skilled employment (0.017). However, this
pattern is the opposite among undocumented workers, high skill undocumented employment
displays a higher volatility (0.165) than low skill undocumented employment (0.058). In ad-
dition, low and medium skill undocumented employment becomes less volatile in the 2000s,
relative to the 1990s, whereas high skill undocumented employment becomes more volatile.
This increased volatility among undocumented workers employed in high skill industries may
reect an increased monitoring of valid of SSNs for higher skilled positions.
In terms of labor intensity, we again see an opposite pattern among documented and un-
documented worker employment volatility. Whereas employment of undocumented workers
in industries with the highest level of labor intensity is more volatile than in industries with
the lowest labor intensity (0.097 vs. 0.080), its the opposite among documented workers. In
addition, the degree to which volatility of undocumented worker employment exceeds that
of documented worker employment increases with labor intensity of the industry in which
the workers are employed. This would make sense as more labor intensive rms also likely
have more exibility in adjusting employment to meet changing demand.
While much of the di¤erence in volatility in employment across documented status is
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likely related to di¤erences in skill levels of workers, age, or industries in which workers are
employed, the nuances described above across skill and labor intensity, however, suggest that
there are some intriguing di¤erences within workers legal status.
Table 24 presents the correlation of the cyclical components of undocumented and doc-
umented employment with U.S. GDP and GAgsp. We observe that the movements of em-
ployment of documented and undocumented workers relate di¤erently to overall economic
uctuations. Documented employment is more highly correlated with contemporaneous US
GDP (0.76) and GA GSP (0.71) than with lead and lagged values. The correlation declines
as one moves in either direction from the current time period. In contrast, the cyclical
component of undocumented worker employment is most highly correlated with US GDP
and GA GSP lagged two quarters, 0.68 and 0.58 respectively, and declining on either side.
This indicates that rms adjust undocumented worker employment with a lag; slower to be
terminated in a downturn and slower to be hired on the upswing than documented workers.
U.S. GDP Documented Undocumented
t-2 0.54 0.67
t-1 0.68 0.64
t 0.76 0.50
t+1 0.65 0.35
t+2 0.45 0.15
Georgia GSP
t-2 0.43 0.58
t-1 0.57 0.56
t 0.71 0.50
t+1 0.68 0.39
t+2 0.62 0.28
Table 24: Correlation of cylical components of U.S. GDP and Georgia GSP with documented
and undocumented employment
A question arises as to the source of this lag structure. Unlike the labor markets for
skilled and unskilled labor, where observed wage di¤erentials are likely reecting only di¤er-
ences in productivity across these groups of workers. Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2010)[44]
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provide evidence that about 30% of the observed wage di¤erential between documented and
undocumented workers derives from di¤erences in labor supply elasticities. In other words,
undocumented workers are paid less than their marginal revenue product. If this is the case,
one can imagine a scenario where a rm heading into recession is acutely cost conscious and
wants to get the biggest bang for its buck regarding work force reductions. The most ex-
pensive workers, for a given level of productivity (documented workers) will be released rst.
However, this can only be sustained for a short period of time, apparently approximately two
quarters, when undocumented workers are released as concerns over productivity overtake
e¤orts of immediate cost cutting. Coming out of a recession, wages have likely fallen so that
the cost di¤erential between documented and undocumented workers for a given productiv-
ity level has also likely shrunk, in which case employers would prefer to re-hire documented
workers rst.
Figure 9 focuses more narrowly on the dynamics of documented and undocumented
worker employment specically across recessions. Following the methodology of Jaimovich,
Pruitt and Siu (2009)[46], we set the date to 0 for all the NBER dated recessions and follow
the cyclical component of both series for 20 quarters following the onset of the recession.
We average across all the recessional responses. The graph shows the di¤erence in the
magnitudes of the uctuations of the cyclical components of documented and undocumented
employment. The response of undocumented employment to a recession is roughly down
by 11% at its trough, whereas for the documented employment it is only down about 3.5%.
The average peak to trough response of documented employment is about 7.5% above the
trend whereas the peak to trough response of undocumented employment is about 23%
above the trend. This implies a nearly 3 times stronger response of the undocumented to
employment to a recession on average, and reinforces the greater volatility of undocumented
worker employment identied earlier.
We also observe in Figure 9 the di¤erence in the timing of the employment adjustment
across the business cycle; documented employment declines (or becomes negative) contempo-
raneously with the start of the recession, whereas undocumented employment is still positive
for the two following quarters, but declines dramatically falling to a greater depth than doc-
umented worker employment. Documented employment reaches its trough at period 6, with
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Figure 9: Average response of the cyclical component of documented and undocumented
employment: Date 0 is the onset of the recession as identied by NBER
undocumented employment reaching its trough around period 9.
Following Hansen and Prescott (2005)[39], we calculate the depth of cyclical uctuations
in undocumented and documented employment. We average the cyclical components across
all periods above and below the trend level for both series. These results also conrm
that uctuations are deeper for undocumented workers, ranging from +5% to -7%, than for
documented, whose employment uctuates between +2% and -2%.
From many di¤erent angles, the stylized facts presented here conrm that employment
of undocumented workers is more volatile than employment of documented workers across
the business cycle. Although not a foregone conclusion, this was not unexpected. Undocu-
mented workers share characteristics with other groups of workers, such as immigrants and
the unskilled, who have been found by others to experience more volatile employment than
their counterparts (i.e., natives and skilled workers). In addition, as pointed out by Passel
and Cohn (2009a)[63] undocumented workers are known to be much younger, on average
than the population of documented workers and Jaimovich et al. (2009)[46] has also found
that employment among young workers is generally more volatile across the business cycle
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than employment among older workers.
4.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The previous section illustrated the degree to which employment dynamics of undocumented
workers across the business cycle di¤ers from that of documented workers. One of the
reasons theorized to lead to these di¤erences in volatility and timing in peaks and troughs is
the degree to which documented and undocumented workers are complementary to capital
in the production process. Documented workers, typically in possession of higher skills, on
average, than undocumented workers, are expected to be employed in jobs which require
more intensive use of capital; undocumented workers are expected to be employed in jobs
where they are not required to use capital as intensively as documented workers (Dustmann
et al. (2010)[30]). This lower complementarity with capital, and the fact that capital inputs
are xed in the short-run, will lead to greater variability in employment as the rm adjusts
its production across the business cycle. When rms want to reduce production during a
recession (i.e., in the short-run) they will do so by adjusting inputs that are most exible.
Since capital stock is xed rms cannot adjust the capital stock so they will adjust the input
which is more closely substitutable with capital. In the context of this paper, that would
likely be undocumented workers, rather than documented workers.
The next subsection discusses a production technology where undocumented labor is
more substitutable with physical capital than documented labor. The subsections following
that evaluate the performance of this production function in explaining the di¤erences in
the volatility of documented and undocumented employment at business cycle frequency.
4.4.1 The Production Technology
In our quantitative analysis, we adapt the production technology used in KORV (2000)[50]
and express the output produced in Georgia as follows;
Yt = At[U

t + (1  )fKt + (1  )Dt g=]1= (4.1)
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Here Ut denotes undocumented workers, and Dt denotes documented workers. At is a
neutral technology shock, which can be described by the following stochastic process:
At = exp(zt) (4.2)
zt = zt 1 + "t (4.3)
where E("t) = 0 and var("t) = 2"
Here 1=(1 ) corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between undocumented work-
ers and capital-documented labor composite and 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution
between documented workers and physical capital. In this framework,  >  implies that
documented workers are more complementary to capital than undocumented workers.
wDt = At(1  )(1  )Y 1 t fKt + (1  )Dt g(= 1)D 1t (4.4)
wUt = AtY
1 
t U
 1
t (4.5)
rt = At(1  )Y 1 t fKt + (1  )Dt g(= 1)K 1t (4.6)
wDt
wUt
=
(1  )(1  )fKt + (1  )Dt g(= 1)D 1t
U  1t
(4.7)
4.4.2 Parameterization
The rst step in our quantitative analysis is to pin down the parameters of the model. There
are four parameters that need to be specied. These are the share parameters  and  and
the elasticity parameters  and  in equation (4.1).
KORV (2000)[50] estimate the value of  which measures the degree of substitution
between unskilled labor and capital or skilled labor in their model as 0:4. Their estimate for
 which determines the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital is  0:495.
We borrow the value of  and  from their study and calibrate  and  to match the average
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wage bill ratio between documented and undocumented labor in Georgia between 1990 and
2008. To compute the wage bill ratio we calculate the total wage bill for undocumented
and documented workers by multiplying the average quarterly wage income with the total
number of these workers in the Georgia labor force. Table 25 reports the value of the wage
bill ratio in the data and in the model along with the value of which produces this data
moment.
Data moment Model Data
 = 0:007 Wage bill ratio - undocumented 6.03 6.03
and documented labor
 = 0:012 Income share of labor 56% 56%
Table 25: Calibration result: Data and simulated moment
4.4.3 Simulation Results
In this section we assess the performance of our model in explaining the di¤erence between the
volatility of documented and undocumented employment. In other words, we evaluate the
importance of di¤erent degrees of substitution elasticity between capital and undocumented
and documented labor to account for the higher variation of the undocumented employment
at business cycle frequency.
Analogous to Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008)[23], we use our parameters, the actual series
for capital stock Kt, the number of documented workers Dt, and the series for the relative
earnings of documented and undocumented workers wDt =w
U
t to obtain a predicted series for
undocumented employment bUt. Following this we extract the cyclical component of the
simulated series cU ct and compute its standard deviation.
Figure 10 presents the cyclical component of the undocumented employment from the
benchmark model compared to its data counterpart. Table 26 reports the cyclical properties
of the simulated undocumented employment series. In particular we report the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the undocumented employment produced by our
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model and its contemporaneous correlation with that of Georgias output.
1990:1 1992:1 1994:1 1996:1 1998:1 2000:1 2002:1 2004:1 2006:1 2008:1
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
model
data
Figure 10: Cylical component of undocumented employment: Model vs. data
Data Model
1990:1-2008:4 0.07 0.08
1990:1-1999:4 0.08 0.10
2000:1-2008:4 0.06 0.05
Table 26: Volatility of undocumented employment: Model vs. Data
The model produces a standard deviation of 0.08 for the whole period which is a slight
over prediction of the volatility observed in the data for the same period. Looking at the
1990:1-1999:4 and 2000:1-2008:4 periods separately, we observe that the model does well in
matching the volatility of the undocumented employment for both sub periods. In particular
for the second sub-period covering the quarters between 2000 and 2008, our model generates
an undocumented employment series with a standard deviation of 0.05. The standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the undocumented employment is measured as 0.06
in the data for the same period implying that our model can explain 80% of the cyclical
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variation of undocumented employment after 1999. For the 1990-1999 period, the volatility
of the model simulated undocumented employment is 0.1, which is approximately 20% higher
than the actual standard deviation which is 0.08 in the data.
These results suggest that the model performs well in explaining the higher volatility of
the undocumented labor in Georgia for the 1990-2008 period. In particular exploiting the
di¤erences in the elasticity of substitution between the two groups of workers and capital
we can explain an important portion of the higher variance of the undocumented labor
during the 2000-2008 period. The model also captures the reduction in the volatility of
undocumented employment observed in the data after 1999. The models prediction for the
volatility of the undocumented employment series is slightly higher for the 1990-1999 period
which results in a larger standard deviation for the whole period.
Although we are interested in the high frequency behavior of the undocumented em-
ployment, we also evaluate our models ability in matching the long-term behavior of the
series. Figures 11 and 12 compare the model and data values for undocumented employ-
ment and its trend component. Under the current set of parameters, we see that the model
has limited capability in explaining the long-run behavior of undocumented employment.
The model captures the increase in undocumented employment for the 1990:1-1995:4 period.
After that we observe a steeper increase in the data whereas the model produces a slowly
increasing then decreasing series for undocumented employment.
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Figure 11: Undocumented employment: Model vs. data
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Figure 12: Trend component of undocumented employment: Model vs. data
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4.5 CONCLUSION
The sensitivity of employment of individuals belonging to di¤erent demographic groups to
business cycles has been analyzed in the literature in recent years. The existing studies
have examined how the employment of skilled vs. unskilled, young vs. old, and natives
vs. immigrant workers behave di¤erently from each other at business cycle frequency. In
this paper we have studied the same dimension for documented and undocumented workers.
Using quarterly data on the number of employed documented and undocumented workers
in Georgia between 1990 and 2008, we have shown that the employment of undocumented
workers is more volatile than the documented ones. Industry-level employment gures for
these workers reveal that the same volatility di¤erence is observable in di¤erent industries as
well as the aggregate Georgian economy. We provide an explanation of this data fact by using
a simple production technology where rms use capital, documented and undocumented
labor and the undocumented labor is more substitutable with capital. The results from our
quantitative analysis show that with this production technology we can explain an important
portion of the higher sensitivity of undocumented workersemployment to the business cycles
in Georgia.
The results in this paper suggest that employment of undocumented workers may provide
a degree of exibility to the production process of rms that hire them. The consistency
of these results with those found by others when comparing the employment volatility of
unskilled, young, and immigrant workers, compared with employment volatility of skilled,
older, and native workers, respectively, is not surprising; undocumented workers are typically
low skilled, young, and are, by denition, immigrants. Although undocumented workers
make up a much smaller group of workers than the low-skilled, young, or immigrants, this role
of providing additional production exibility means that immigration reform that restricts
the number, or a¤ects the status of undocumented workers would also curtail the exibility in
labor markets that employers currently have, increasing hiring costs along with the likelihood
of an increase in consumer prices.
As we acknowledge among the discussion of our results, the model has some shortcomings
in explaining the long-run behavior of the employment of undocumented workers. We plan
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to address this issue in future work. There are alternative possible theories which explain
the di¤erential cyclical response of undocumented employment. These theories are listed
in Dustmann et al. (2010)[30]. Equilibrium search models form the foundation of one
explanation. These models originate from the work of Diamond (1982)[28], Mortensen
(1982)[59] and Pissarides (1985)[69]. In these models, a worker is hired under the condition
that a successful match is established between the rm and the worker. Unemployment is an
equilibrium outcome due to the cost of opening a vacancy. The unemployment rate uctuates
along the business cycles together with the labor productivity of workers hence the pay-o¤
from opening vacancies. These models can provide an explanation for the higher volatility
of the employment of undocumented workers. The key insight proposed by Dustman et al.
(2010)[30] is based on the di¤erent seperation rates observed among workers. If a worker has
lower seperation rate, i.e. he is expected to stay with the rm longer, his average productivity
rather than his current productivity is more important for the rm. When the seperation
rates are higher for a group of workers, it is the current productivity that matters for the
hiring decision hence posting vacancies. Therefore di¤erences in seperation rates might be
one factor which cause the documented and undocumented workers to respond di¤erently to
business cycle uctuations even though they have identical productivity.
Another factor linked to di¤erences in seperation rates which might generate a higher
cyclical volatility for undocumented workers is the lower cost of ring undocumented workers.
Undocumented workers are not covered by provisions such as severance payments, or limi-
tations on dismissal of employees. This makes not only ring but also hiring these workers
easier during downturns and expansions of the economy. An interesting avenue for future
research is to study the business cycle properties of undocumented workersemployment in
a general equilibrium model incorporating the di¤erences in the ring costs for both groups
of workers.
An alternative theory which can provide an explanation for the di¤erential response
of undocumented labor to expansions and recessions of the economy is the existence of
dual labor markets. Saint-Paul (1996)[72] and Bulow and Summers (1986)[18] discusses
these labor markets. In Bulow and Summers (1986)[18] there is a homogenous group of
workers and two types of jobs - primary and secondary- which have di¤erent monitoring
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technologies. In the primary sector where the monitoring technology is costly workers are
paid higher wages to prevent them from shirking. In the secondary sector, workers are paid
lower wages since it is less costly to monitor them. Di¤erences in monitoring costs between
the two sectors generate higher volatility of employment in the secondary market since the
neutral productivity shocks a¤ect the employment in these markets more directly. Saint-
Paul (1996, pp. 45-58)[72] elaborates on these dual markets. In his framework, workers
in the primary sector have a higher incentive to shirk in anticipation of layo¤s by the rm.
Therefore the rms abstain from ring these workers during the downturns of the economy
otherwise they have to increase their wages to higher levels to prevent shirking. One remedy
for rms to adjust labor without raising the wage burden too much is to shift the burden
of adjustment to workers in the secondary market who are easier to monitor therefore are
not paid e¢ ciency wages. In an economy where undocumented workers are employed in
secondary markets, the variation in their employment during the business cycles are larger.
This is another direction in which we plan to explore further the underlying reasons for the
higher sensitivity of undocumented workers to business cycles.
Illegal immigrants which account for a majority of the undocumented labor force are
mostly evaluated in terms of the scal burden they create for the economy. However based
on the dual markets theory we can claim that the existence of a more exible secondary mar-
ket helps rms to avoid paying unnecessarily high e¢ ciency wages to documented workers
in anticipation of rings due to negative productivity shocks. In other words, the existence
of a lower segment of the labor markets dominated by illegal workers results in a lower un-
employment rate in the economy; however, the documented primary sector workers are paid
smaller wages. An interesting area for future research is a welfare analysis of undocumented
employment or illegal immigration in a general equilibrium e¢ ciency wage model with dual
labor markets which are subject to productivity shocks. The impact of the segmented la-
bor market structure on the total labor earnings in the economy is ambiguous because as
mentioned above, the existence of a secondary market where undocumented workers are
employed results in lower wages and higher employment level among the primary sector
workers. The equilibrium labor income taxes, total savings hence interest rates depend on
the total wage earnings in the economy which all together are important determinants of
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the overall welfare. A general equilibrium model with the specied features will allow an
extensive evaluation of the undocumented workersimpacts on the welfare of documented
ones taking into account the changes observed in all prices and tax rates in the economy.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX
A. DATA
Labor Supply Measures
Canadian data for the 1981-2008 period comes from Statistics Canada. I made use of two di¤erent
micro data sets. The rst one is the Survey of Consumer Finances data for individuals aged 15 years and
over between income years 1981 and 1997. Survey of Consumer Finances data set is terminated after 1997.
Starting with 1998, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics micro data set is the source for annual cross-
sectional income estimates and other individual level variables. Unfortunately, 1997 and 1998 SLID data
sets do not provide information on the nativity status of the individual. Therefore I construct the labor
supply data for the 1999-2008 period and use interpolation to nd the labor supply data for 1998. The data
source for the U.S. is the IPUMS database. I use 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census 2% samples and 2008 CPS
data to construct the aggregate labor supply measures for the U.S.
The sample consists of employed wage and salary workers between ages 16 and 65. I drop individuals
with 0 or unknown hours worked. For the construction of composition adjusted labor hours by two skill
groups, I follow KORV (2000). A brief description of the aggregation of the individual labor inputs are
provided below
Aggregation of individual labor inputs
All the individuals included in the sample are divided into demographic groups according to their age,
nativity, education level and sex. There are 10 ve year age group, two nativity groups (native and foreign
born), two sex groups, and 4 education groups. In total there are 160 demographic groups.
The four education groups are less than high school, high school, some college and college graduates.
In SCF data, the variable indicating education level of the individual is educ. In SLID data this variable is
hleveg. I construct the education groups as follows;
a) Less than high school: All individuals with less than 12 years of schooling. (educ<4 or hleveg<6)
b) High school graduates: All individuals 12 or 13 years of schooling. (educ=4 or educ=5, or hleveg=6)
c) Some college: All individuals with some post secondary education or post secondary certicate or
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diploma. (educ=6 or educ=7 or 8hleveg10)
d) College graduate: All individuals with a university degree. (educ=8, hleveg=11 or hleveg=12)
For each of the demographic subgroups, I construct the composition adjusted total hours worked. To
be able to construct the average labor supply by each demographic group, I rst nd the labor input of each
individual by multiplying the usual hours worked in a week (hrswrk, ushours after 1989) with the weeks
worked last year (wkswrk).
li;t = hi;twki;t
where li;t is the total hours worked in a year, hi;t is the hours worked last week, and wki;t is the weeks
worked last year.
The SLID data set does not provide data for usual hours worked in a week, but there is information
about total hours paid (alhrp), weeks worked in all jobs (wksem) during the year. Dividing alhrp by wkesm,
I obtain hours worked in a week hi;t. Since the hours worked in a week is top coded at 65 hours in SCF
data, I apply the same top coding to SLID data as well.
The next step is to aggregate the total hours worked by individuals and nd the labor input for each
demographic subgroup. The labor input for each of the 160 demographic groups are calculated as follows.
lg;t =
P
ig li;ti;tP
ig i;t
where i;t are the weights for each person(revweig or weight after 1989 in SCF, icswt
or wtcsld in SLID) and lg;t is the total hours worked by all the individuals belonging to group g:
Hourly wages
To nd the hourly wages of each demographic subgroup I rst obtain the hourly wages by individuals
as follows;
wi;t =
yi;t
li;t
where yi;t total annual income (wagsal) and li;t is the total hours worked by each individual. The SLID
data set provides information on hourly wages (cmphrw). I use this variable for hourly wages after 1999.
The hourly wages by each demographic subgroup are;
wg;t =
P
ig wi;ti;tP
ig i;t
Labor Inputs and Hourly Wages by Skilled and Unskilled
The next step is to aggregate the labor inputs by all the demographic subgroups into skilled and unskilled
categories. The sample is divided into skilled and unskilled according to their education levels. All the
individuals with a university degree and above are considered as skilled.
When aggregating the demographic subgroups into two skill groups, I use e¢ ciency weights and calculate
a weighted sum of the labor inputs of each demographic subgroup included in that skill group. There are
di¤erent alternatives one can use as e¢ ciency weights. I use the average hourly wages by each demographic
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group between 1981 and 2008. This gives the skilled and unskilled labor inputs and hourly wages which are
the following;
Lj;t =
X
gGj;t
lg;t
 
wgg;t
Wj;t =
P
gGj;t
lg;tg;twg;t
Lj;t
for j = s; u
Construction of the Capital Stock
To compute the skill premium, I need to obtain the real value of the capital equipment stock for Canada.
In order to obtain the real values of the capital equipment stock, a price deator for the machinery and
equipment capital is necessary. Statistics Canada provides the price index for machinery and equipment.
Table 327-0016, provides quarterly price index for machinery and equipment until 2005. The base year is
1986 in this series. Table 327-0042 provides the price index starting from 1997 until 2010 with base year
1997. I use the rst series for the 1981-1997 period and the second series for the 1997-2008 period. I convert
the base year to 2002 in both series and combine the two data to obtain a price index for machinery and
equipment for the 1981-2008 period. As pointed out by Cummins and Violante (2002) for the U.S. data,
the price index for machinery and equipment provided by NIPA does not take into account changes in the
quality of these goods. Therefore they construct a quality adjusted machinery and price index for the U.S.
Unfortunately, there is no similar study for Canada. However Cummins and Violante (2002) calculate the
average growth rate of the quality improvement as 2.5% for the 1960-2002 period. I assume that Canada
also experienced the same improvement in the quality of machinery and equipment and adjust the price
index for machinery and equipment by this quality factor. The quality adjusted price index for Canada is
calculated as follows;
pt = Pm;t  (1:025)1981 t8t = 1981; ::2008
The data series for machinery and equipment capital is available in table 031-0002 (Flows and stocks of
xed non-residential capital by NAICS classication). I use the end year net stock by geometric discounting
series for the year 1980-2007 and deate it by the quality adjusted price index pt:
Kreale;t =
Knominale;t
pt
B. DECOMPOSITION OF LOG CHANGE IN RELATIVE SKILLED LABOR
 log(
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX
A. DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION
Measurement of college graduates and less than college graduates
As mentioned in the paper the data for the initial state in 1980 is extracted from 1981 SCF (Survey
of Consumer Finance) and the data for the nal state in 2008 is extracted from SLID(Survey of labor and
Income Dynamics). 1981 SCF microdata has a variable called educ which indicates the education level of
individuals. The education categories available are no schooling or elementary, 9 or 10 years of elementary
school 11 years of elementary school 12 years of elementary school, 13 years of elementary school some post
secondary , post secondary certicate and university degree. The data set does not provide any information
on the years of schooling of individuals therefore I consider individuals with a university degree as college
graduates and all the remaining ones as less than college graduates. To keep the denition of a college
graduate consistent across two data sets, I also consider the individuals with a bachelors degree and above
as college educated and all individuals below bachelors degree as less than college graduate. The education
variable used to classify individuals is hleveg. This variable can have 12(01-12) di¤erent values in 2008 SLID
data. A value of 11 indicates that the individual has a bachelors degree and a value of 12 indicates that the
individual has a university certicate above bachelors degree. So I classify an individual with hleveg11
as a college graduate and everyone else as less than college educated.
Measurement of Immigrants
I include individuals aged above 22 in my immigrant population. The variable immig gives information
about the immigration status of an individual in the 1981 SCF sample. immig takes 8 values(1-8) indicating
the immigration status of an individual. immig>1 implies that the individual is immigrant and each value
indicates the 10 year interval during which the individual entered Canada. 2008 SLID microdata set has
two di¤erent variables for the immigrant status of an individual. These two variables are immst and
yrimmg. For immigrants immst takes a value of 1 and yrimmg gives information about how many years
ago the individual came to Canada. To categorize individuals into natives and immigrants, I use the immst
variable.
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Use of sample weights
To nd the relative share of each group, I calculate the total weight of the relevant group and nd the
ratio of this sum to the total weight of the bigger group. The variables which indicate the sample weight of
each individual are revweig and wtcsld in the 1981 SCF and 2008 SLID samples, respectively.
E¢ ciency units
The e¢ ciency units are calculated for 4 di¤erent groups which are college graduate natives and immi-
grants and less than college graduate natives and immigrants. To calculate the age e¢ ciency units for each
group, I follow Krusell et al.(2000) methodology and compute the average value of hourly wages between
1981 and 2008 as e¢ ciency weights for each group at all ages. The sample includes full time full year wage
and salary workers aged between 18-65 (22-65 for college graduate natives and immigrants). I also exclude
all individuals with an hourly wage below $1.
The rst step is the calculation of hourly wages for each individual in the sample. 1981-1997 SCF
microdata does not provide information about the hourly wages of individuals. However the variable wagsal
is the total wage and salary earnings of the individual. To nd the hourly wages, I calculate the total hours
worked for an individual by multiplying the weekly hours worked (hrswrk) and the weeks worked in a given
year (wkswrk). Having obtained total hours worked, I divide the annual wage and salary earnings by the
total hours worked and get the hourly wages. In Krusell et al.(2000) notation, I compute
wi;t =
yi;t
li;t
where yi;t total annual income and li;t is the total hours worked by each individual. For
the SLID data between 1999 and 2008 has a variable which indicates the hourly wages of an individual so I
do not need to make the same calculation for this period. Instead I use the the variable cmphrw variable.
Having merged all samples, I nd the weighted average hourly wage for each group at all ages between 18
and 65. To formulate this weighted average,
wo;ej =
P
i w
o;e
i;j 
o;e
iP
i 
o;e
i;j
where i indicates the individual, j = 18; ::65 and o 2 fn;mg e 2 fc; hg. Lastly I
normalize the weighted hourly wage of each age, nativity, and skill group by the weighted hourly wage of
the age 40 individuals in the same nativity and skill group. So the e¢ ciency weights used in the model are
as follows;
"o;ej =
wo;ej
wo;e40
The following gure illustrates the age e¢ ciency units for the natives.
Relative price of machinery and equipment
The price of machinery and equipment relative to consumer nondurables illustrated in gure 2 is cal-
culated using the price index for machinery and equipment and the price index for consumer non-durables
available through StatCan. The price index for machinery and equipment between 1980 and 2008 is the
combination of two di¤erent price index series. The rst one covers the period between 1980 and 2005. The
source is table 327-0016- machinery and equipment price indexes (MEPI), base year 1986. The second data
set covers the period between 1997-2008. The source is the Table 327-0042 Machinery and equipment price
indexes (MEPI) base year 1997. The price index for consumer non-durables between 1980 and 2008 is
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Figure 13: Age e¢ ciency unit proles: 1981-2008 Average. Solid Line- College graduates,
Dashed Line- High school graduates
extracted from table 326-0021 CPI 2005 basket with base year 2002. Both machinery and equipment price
index series are quarterly therefore as a rst step in calculating the relative price of machinery and equip-
ment, I average across quarters in a year to nd the annual price index for machinery and equipment. The
second step is to form a uniform base year across the three price index series. To achieve that, I normalize
the two price series for machinery and equipment by the value of the price index in 2002, and convert the
machinery and equipment price indices to base year 2002. To get a machinery and equipment price index
which covers the whole period between 1980 and 2008, I combine the two price indices for machinery and
equipment. Comparing the common data points (1997-2005) of the two series shows that there is a di¤erence
in the levels of the two series. In order to avoid any jumps that may occur in the combined data set, I
compute the annual growth rate of the price index for machinery and equipment between years 2005 and
2008. Applying these growth rates to the data points starting from 2005 I extrapolate the price index of
machinery and equipment until 2008. The next step is to nd the relative price of machinery and equipment.
I divide the machinery and equipment price index series by the CPI for consumer nondurables which gives
me the relative price of machinery and equipment between 1980 and 2008.
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Log hourly wage 1981 1991 2001 2008
College education 0.346* 0.36* 0.394* 0.422*
age 0.065 0.078 0.100 0.11
age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
male 0.335 0.270 0.204 0.183
Table 27: Regression results of log hourly wages on a college education dummy, age, age
squared, and a male dummy. indicates signicance at 1 percen
B. LIFE CYCLE ASSET PROFILES
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Figure 14: Life cycle asset proles of natives. Left Panel: College graduates, Right Panel:
Less than college graduates. Solid line- lowest ability, Dashed line- median ability, Dotted
line- highest ability
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Figure 15: Life cycle asset proles of immigrants and natives
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
A. SKILL AND LABOR INTENSITY CATEGORIES
Industry Skill Classication
Each industry is assigned a skill intensity based on the weighted average of educational attainment of
workers in that industry, using the Current Population Survey for 1994. This year was chosen since this is the
rst year in which the nativity (place of birth) of respondents is reported. For each industry, the percent of
workers with less than a high school education (LTHS), a high school education (HS), some college (SCOLL),
college degree (COLL), and graduate education (GRAD) is calculated. If the share of workers with less than
high school degree is higher than the sum of individuals with high school, some college and college education
in an industry, that industry is classied as low skill. In the opposite case, the industry is classied as high
skill. If the share of workers with below high school education is equal to the share of workers with the high
school, some college and college education is classied as medium skill.
About 23% of the industries are classied as high skill, 15% at low skill, and 62% at medium skill.
Some examples of low skill industries include agriculture, some manufacturing, and accommodation and food
services. Medium skill industries include construction, retail trade, some manufacturing, some education and
health, and arts and entertainment. High skill industries include the information sector, electronic computer
manufacturing, the nancial sector, and some education and health.
Industry Labor Intensity Classication
Labor share for each industry is based on coe¢ cients from the U.S. Input-Output (I-O) Benchmark Ta-
bles 2002 (http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm#benchmark_io). The labor share coe¢ cient is dened
as the share of compensation of employees (wage bill) in total industry output. Compensation of employees
includes wages and salaries and their supplements.
Total industry output is the sum of the products consumed by the industry, compensation of employees,
taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and gross operating surplus.
Coe¢ cients are calculated at the four-digit NAICS industry level and grouped in 3 levels. Level 1
includes coe¢ cients from 0.01 to 0.29 (cost of labor accounts for from one to 29 percent of total output),
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level 2 includes coe¢ cients equal to 0.30 to 0.39, and level 3 includes coe¢ cients from 0.40 to 0.79.
Examples of industries in Level 1 are oilseed and grain farming, oil and gas extraction; petroleum
reneries; automobile manufacturing; electronic computer manufacturing; real estate; snack food and break-
fast cereal manufacturing; doll, toy, and game manufacturing; telecommunications; cutlery, utensil, pot, and
pan manufacturing; rail transportation; and book publishers. In Level 2, we nd footwear manufacturing;
printing; dry-cleaning and laundry services; tire manufacturing; watch, clock, and other measuring and
controlling device manufacturing; tness and recreational sports centers; child day care services; insurance
agencies; brokerages; wholesale and retail trade; and food services and drinking places. Level 3 includes cut
and sew apparel contractors, custom computer programming services, scientic research and development
services, elementary and secondary schools, nursing and residential care facilities, home health care services
and employment service.
B. PROXY FOR GEORGIA GROSS STATE PRODUCT
Georgias Gross State Product is an annual series and to obtain a proxy for a quarterly series we look at
US gross domestic product, Georgia personal income less transfers. We calculated the correlations between
the log of these series and the log of Georgias GSP as well as the correlation between the cyclical components
of these series, and we concluded to use personal income less transfers. The results of these correlations are
as follows:
Correlation of logged series GA GSP
U.S. GDP 0.98
GA Personal income-Transfers 0.99
Correlation of cyclical components
U.S. GDP 0.70
GA Personal income-Transfers 0.77
Table A1: Source Haver analytics
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